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developing  countries,  and uses  illustrative  examples  to  * If properly  designed,  the  formula-based  system
show how the calculations should be carried out. The  eliminates the disincentive inherent in many
author also discusses implementation issues, including  discretionary systems that encourages overspending and
the transition from an old to a new transfer system.  weak tax collection efforts.
Finally, he presents an illustrative equalization transfer
model for China.
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PART L INTRODUCTION
This paper  provides  an overview  of the intergovernmental  fiscal  transfer  mechanisms  in nine  major
industrial and developing  countries,  with special reference  to the design of equalization  transfers.  The
countries  selected  are the United  States,  Canada,  the United  Kingdom,  Australia,  Germany,  Japan, Korea,
India, ancl  Indonesia. Most of these countries  have relatively  developed  formula-based  transfer systems,
and represent  the major  varieties  of transfer  systems  adopted  in the world.
The  three sections  in Part I present  a brief review  of the economic  rationales  and basic criteria  for
designing  an intergovernmental  transfer system.  The following  nine sections in Part II  discuss the
mechanisms  adopted by these nine countries, respectively. Part Im compares and contrasts the nine
countries'  transfer systems  and, based on the comparison,  attempts  to draw implications  for developing
countries  that are considering  or are in the process  of reforming  their intergovernmental  transfer systems.
It classifies  the transfer formulas into four categories,  analyzes the data requirements  of each type of
formula, and uses illustrative examples  to  show how the calculations  should be implemented. A few
implementation  issues, including  the transitional arrangement  from an old to a new system, are also
considered  in this part.  Part IV presents an illustrative  equalization  transfer model  for China and the
simulatiom  results using 1994 data.  The appendix  of this paper discusses  a number of country  cases on
fiscal  transfers from state (provincial)  level  governments  to lower  level  governments.
In  this paper,  we use "grant"  and "transfer"  interchangeably  to refer  to paynent of funds  from one
level  of the government  to another.
1.1.  Economic  Rationales for Intergovernmental  Transfer
The literature of fiscal federalism suggests several economic  rationales for intergovernmental
transfers:  1
A. Addressing  vertical fiscal imbalances. In most countries,  the national government
retains the major tax  bases, leaving insufficient  fiscal resources to  the  subnational
See  Broadway  et al (1993),  Shah  (1994),  and  Rosen  (1995).
1governments  for covering  their expenditure  needs. Intergovernmental  transfer is therefore
needed  to balance  the budget  at the subnational  levels.
B. Addressing  horizontal  fiscal imbalances. On one hand, some jurisdictions  may have
better access  to natural resources  or other  tax bases that are not available  in others. They
may also have  higher  income  levels  than  those in other  jurisdictions. These  are refereed  to
as  differences  in fiscal capacities.  On the other hand, some jurisdictions may have
extraordinary  expenditure  needs, because they have high proportions  of poor, old, and
young  population,  or because  they  need  to maintain  national  airports  and harbors. The net
fiscal benefits, measured by the gap between fiscal capacity and fiscal need, is often
caused by such uncontrollable  factors and therefore should be addressed by central
government  transfer. 2
A weaker  version of this argument states that the central  government  has the obligation
maintain a minimum  standard of public service in all the subnational  units.  Regions
without  sufficient  resources  to reach  this minimum  level  should  be subsidized.
C. Addressing  inter-jurisdictional  spill-over  effects. Some public services  have spill-over
effects (or externalities)  on other  jurisdictions. Examples  are pollution  control (water or
air), inter-regional  highway,  higher education  (graduates  may leave for other regions to
work),  fire departments  (may  be used by neighboring  areas), etc. Without reaping  all the
benefits of these projects, a  local government  tends to  underinvest  in such projects.
Therefore,  the center government  needs to provide incentives  or financial resources to
address  such  problems  of under-provision.
1.2. Criteria  for an Effective  Transfer  System
An effective  transfer  system  should  satisfy several  criteria 3:
2 Some  scholars  have  argued  that the market  itself  will  perforn the function  of equalization,  and there is no
need  for the government  to be involved.  This argument  is based on the assumption  that population  and other
resources  have  a high degree  of mobility.  If a country's  population  is perfectly  mobile  across  regions,  then  the
differenials  of public  service  will  not exist,  because  people  can  always  move  to jurisdictions  that provide  better
services.  With an increasing  population  in such  a jurisdiction,  the benefits  each  person  can receive  will  decline,
and equalization  of fiscal  benefits  takes  place. However,  in no country  is the  population  perfectly  mobile,  due  to
factors  such  as moving  costs  and employment  constraints,  and  people  may  not have  the perfect  information  about
levels  and qualities  of public  services  in all regions. The  lack  of mobility  among  the  population  tends  to create  a
high  level,  or even  increasing  levels,  of uneven  development  pattems  across  regions,  as financially  strong  regions
tend  to save  and invest  more  and develop  faster  than  financially  weak  regions.
3 Shah  (1995).
2Revenue  adequacy:  the subnational  authorities  should  have sufficient  resources,  with the
transfers,  to undertake  the designated  responsibilities.
Local tax  effort and  expenditure control: ensuring sufficient tax  efforts by  local
authorities.  Formulas  should  not encourage  fiscal deficits.
Equity:  transfer should  vary directly  with local fiscal needs and inversely  with local fiscal
capacity.
Transparency  and stability:  the formulas  should  be announced  and each locality  should  be
able to forecast its own total revenue  (including  transfers) in order  to prepare  its budget.
knd the formulas  should  be stable for at least a few years (3-5 years) to allow long-term
planning  at the local level.
1.3. Types of Intergovernmental  Transfer
There are basically  two types of grants, conditional  and unconditional.
iA.  Conditional  grants. These  are sometimes  called  specific  purpose  grants or categorical  grants.
The central  government  specifies  the purposes  for which  the recipient  government  can use the funds. Such
a grant is often  used to address  concerns  that are highly  important  to the center but are considered  less so
by the subnational  governments. Examples  are projects with inter-regional  spill-over  effects.  Within
conditiornal  grants,  there are several  types:
L.  Matching  Open-Ended  Grants.  For a unit of money  given  by the donor to support a
particular  activity,  a certain  sum must be expended  by the recipient. For example,  a grant
might  indicate  that whenever  a local governnent  spends  a dollar on education,  the central
government  will contribute  a dollar (or fifty cents)  as well. With an open-ended  matching
grant, the cost to the donor ultimately  depends  upon the recipient's  behavior. If the local
government's  expenditure is vigorously stimulated by  the program, then the central
government's  contributions  will  be quite  large and vice versa.
2. Matching Closed-Ended  Grants.  To put a ceiling  on the cost borne by the central
government,  the center  may specify  some  maximum  amount  that it will contribute. This is
called  a closed-ended  matching  grant.  This mechanism  is used by most countries  due to
concerns  of budget  control. In some  countries,  the total sum of matching  grants is limited
by the government  selection  mechanism.
:3.  Non-matching  Grants. In this case,  the central  government  offers  a fixed sum of money
with the stipulation  that it be spent on a specified  public good. The recipient  government
is not required  to match  the contribution  of the central  government.
3B. Unconditional  grants.  An unconditional  grant places no restrictions  on the use of funds.  In
effect, it is a lump  sum grant to the recipient  government.  The  main  justification  for the central  government
to give unconditional  grants to states/provinces  and localities  is that such grants can be used to equalize
fiscal capacities  of different  local governments  to ensure the provision  of a minimum  (or reasonable)  level
of public services.  In most countries, the equalization  grants are transfers made from the central
govenmment  to the subnational  govemments  (e.g., Canada, Australia,  the United  Kingdom,  Japan, Korea,
etc.), while  in Germany,  the equalization  transfer is made from states with above-average  fiscal capacities
to states  with below-average  fiscal capacities. In other  countries,  unconditional  equalization  grants take the
form of a general  revenue-sharing.  The formulas  used to allocate  the equalization  transfers  to subnational
govemment  are the central  element  of this grant system,  and are subject  to intense  debate  both academically
and in practice. And  this is the main focus  of this paper.
PART II. INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS IN NINE COUNTRIES
2.1. The United States
Over the past four decades, grants from the federal govenmment  have increased both in dollar
arnount  and as a proportion  of total federal  outlays  (Table 2.1).  Grants as a percentage  of state and local
expenditures  have also increased  over the long run.  In 1993, grants from federal and state govemment
were about  one third  of the total amount  that localities  spend  (Rosen 1995,  p.536).
Table 2.1. Relation  of Federal Grant-in-Aid  Outlays to Federal, State, and Local Expenditures  (Selected
fiscal  years)
Total  Grants as %  Grants  as %
Grants  of Total  of State & Local
Fiscal  Year  (Bn 1990$)  Federal  Outlays  Expenditures
1950  12.7  5.3  10.4
1960  30.0  7.7  14.7
1970  75.7  12.3  20.0
1980  141.5  15.9  28.0
1990  135.4  10.9  20.0
1993  176.7  14.0  22.0
Source:  Rosen  (1995),  p.536.
Unlike  most other developed  countries,  the United  States  emphasizes  the use of conditional  grants
rather than unconditional  grants. In the early 1990s,  conditional,  or categorical  grants accounted  for more
than 90 percent of federal intergovernmental  transfers (Rosen 1995, p.537). About two-thirds  of this aid
were granted  to state governments,  while  the remainder  was given  directly  to local governments.  The four
most important  categories  of federal aid to states are for health, income security,  education  and training,
and transportation. Health  and income  security  accounted  for 55 percent  of federal  grant outlays  in 1988.
4The major functions  for which  federal  transfers are made directly  to local governments  include  education,
housing  and community  redevelopment,  waste treatment  facilities,  and airport construction  (Hyman  1993).
While all three fonns of conditional  grants (closed-ended  matching,  open-ended  matching, and non-
matching)  are used,  the most common  form is closed  ended  matching  grant.
The intervention  of the federal  government  into  state and local affairs through conditional  grants is
pervasive. In 1991,  a law was passed to discourage  drunken  driving  and voted  to give  money  to states  that
established  anti-drunk  driving  programs. The House  specified  everything  from the percent of blood-alcohol
concentration  that would  be the criterion  for intoxication  to the length  of time the drive's  license  would be
suspended  for a first offense.  This is not atypical.  According  to one count, the federal government
imposed  more  than one  thousand  spending  mandates  upon states and localities  (Rosen  1995,  p.537).
Since  the early 1980s, a new form of transfer, block grants, became  popular under the Reagan
administration. Many categorical  grants were consolidated  into a few broad block grants, which are
essentially  non-matching  conditional  grants. Within a given "block"  of programs,  the recipient  state and
local governments  have more  flexibility  in spending  funds  than with categorical  grants.  One example  of a
block grant program is the Job Training Partnership  Act of 1982. This act provided  funds from federal
revenue  to finance  human  resource  training  programs  administered  by state and local governments  designed
to be tailored  to the particular needs of workers  and employees  in local labor markets (Hyman 1993).
Despite  the efforts of the Reagan  administration,  the categorical  grant still remains  the dominant  means  of
transferring  funds from  the federal  government  to state and local governments.
The fact the United  States has a marked preference  for conditional  grants--and  its corresponding
bias against unconditional  grants--has  aroused the interests  of many scholars. One reason that has been
offered  to explain  the marked  U.S preference  for conditional  grants is the peculia US problems  of fiscally
fragmented metropolitan areas, with concentrations  of low-income people (often ethnically distinct)
clustered  in the decaying  urban core as a result of the flight  to the suburbs by the white  middle  class.  It is
argued  that conditional  grants are a better response  to U.S. needs  than are unconditional  grants, because  the
major interregional  disparities  are not in taxes but in service  levels. "Congress  wants to focus  on particular
services  rather than on the general  level of service  or tax capacity, a substantial  portion of the remaining
grant syslem  is focused  on very narrow  purposes."  (Davis  and Lucker 1982,  p.355) This view  presupposes
that the federal  interest is in actually  providing  certain service  levels,  rather than merely  the possibility  of
attaining  such levels  at average tax rate, as in the equalization  systems  of Canada and Australia (Bird,
1986,  p.159).
2.2. Canada 4
Canada is a federation  of ten provinces (British Columbia,  Alberta, Saskatchewan,  Manitoba,
Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick,  Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland)  and two
4 This section  is based  on  Broadway  and  Hubson  (1993)  and Shah  (1995a).
5territories  (Northwest  Territories  and Yukon). The specific  purpose  transfers from the federal  government
to the territories  are similar to those from the federal government  to the provinces. But for equalization
transfers, the territories receive  more than the provinces  on per capita basis as the equalization  scheme
reflects the greater needs and costs that arise as a  result of the territories' remoteness and  sparse
populations.
The transfer of funds from higher  to lower levels of govemment  has been an important  aspect of
the Canadian  federal system  since  Confederation.  At the time of Confederation,  customs and excise  duties
constituted  the principal  revenue  sources  of government. Because  the Constitution  Act 1867 restricted  fte
provinces  to direct taxation,  a system of grants and statutory  subsidies  was established  to compensate  for
lost revenues. In addition to cash payments,  close-ended  per capita grants were instituted.  The federal
government  also assumed  the provinces'  existing debts and made special grants to New Brunswick  and
Nova Scotia.  These special grants were subsequently  enhanced and also extended to the ew prairie
provinces.
Both the magnitude  and the nature of federal-provincial  transfers  have changed  dramatically  since
World  War II. The scope  of Canada's  equalization  program  has increased,  and transfers  under the program
have  assumed  a major role as a revenue  source for the "have-not"  provinces. In the 1980s,  major changes
in the equalization  program  took place, both  in the formula  and in the growth  rate of payments.
Currently,  there are three major programs of federal  transfers to the provinces:  (1) the Canadian
Equalization  Program: a  constitutionally  mandated unconditional  block transfer program to  support
reasonably  comparable  levels  of services  at reasonably  comparable  levels  of taxation in all provinces;  (2)
the Established  Programs  Financing  (EPF):  conditional  block  (per capita)  transfers  for health  and education
with federal conditions  on accessibility  and standards of service; and (3) the Canadian Assistance Plan
(CAP):  conditional  matching  transfers for welfare  assistance;  and  In 1994/95  fiscal year, the total federal
transfers amounted  to $41.9 billion, among  which EPF accounted  for $21.3 billion,  equalization  program
accounted  for $7.7 billion,  and CAP accounted  for $8.2 billion  (Shah 1995a,  p.244).
The Equalization  Program.  The Canadian  equalization  program  uses a notional  average standard
as the basis for equalization.  The basic  calculation  for the equalization  formula  is that of a province's  tax
capacity. Tax capacity is calculated  as the amount of per capita revenue  that a province  could raise by
applying the national average tax rates to  its tax bases.  The tax capacity of each province is then
compared  with the amount of per capita revenue  that could be raised if the province  has a standard (five
province  average)  per capita  tax base. A province  whose  per capita  tax base is below  the standard  receives
an equalization  payment  equal to the difference  between  the province's  tax capacity and the standard  tax
capacity,  multiplied  by the province's  population. The actual  formula  is:
Eij = tj [ Bj/P, - Bij/P 1] Pi
where
E 1j is entitlement  under revenue  source  j in province  i,
B,j is the base in five  provinces  (standard)  for revenue  source  j,
6P. is the population  of five  provinces,
B 1j is province  i's base for revenue  sources  j,
t, is the:  national  average  tax rate for revenue  source  j, or:
= 1jTRij/X 1Bij
where  TRj;  is actual revenues  under revenue  source  j in province  i.  The total entitlement  of province  i, TE 1,
equals  the sum of all the entitlement  under  different  revenue  sources:
'FE,  = EjEij.
This program  equalizes  have-not  provinces  up to the national average--only  those provinces  that
were beJlow  the national average are affected by the program--and  is paid for out of general federal
revenues. Provinces  whose  tax capacities are above the national average--the  have provinces---are  not
equalized  down. Thus, the system  does  not fully  equalize  tax capacities  across all provinces.
'Currently,  there are 30 revenue  sources for this program.  The main sources include personal
income  taxes, corporate income  tax, secession  duties, general sales taxes, gasoline  taxes, motor vehicle
license  fees, alcoholic  beverage  taxes, forestry taxes, oil royalties,  natural gas royalties, sales of Crown
leases  and reservations  on oil and gas lands, other oil and gas revenues,  metallic  and non-metallic  mineral
revenues,  water power  rentals,  other  provincial  taxes, and miscellaneous  provincial  revenues.
Table 2.2. Erovincial Per Capita Notional Revenues Before and After Equalization, 1990-91
Notional  Equalization  Index of  Index of
Provinces  revenue yield'  Tax capacityb  fiscal capacity'
Newfoundland  2,898  1,686  0.63  0.93
Prince Edward Island  2,988  1,595  0.65  0.93
Nova Scotia  3,517  1,066  0.76  0.93
New Brunswick  3,295  1,288  0.71  0.93
Quebec  3,973  610  0.86  0.93
Ontario  5,085  ...  1.10  1.03
Manitoba  3,737  847  0.81  0.93
Saskatchewan  4,058  525  0.88  0.93
Alberta  6,306  ...  1.36  1.2S
British Columbia  4,808  ...  1.04  0.97
a/ Per capita yield of tax bases at national average  tax rates.
b/ Notional revenue before equalization relative to the national average.
c/ Notional revenue yield after equalization  relative to the national average.
Source: Broadway and Hubson (1993), p.59.
In most cases the determination  of tax bases is relatively  straight forward, based on provincial
data.  The most complex calculation involves  the determination  of the property tax base.  Because
assessment  practices  vary markedly  from province  to province,  a standardized  base cannot  be inferred  from
provincial  data.  Instead,  the value of land and capital in residential  property,  commercial,  industrial and
federal  property,  and farm  property  must be calculated  by province. In the case  of residential  property,  the
value  of buildings  in residential  use is calculated  as a percentage  of the value  of the total residential  capital
stock. T1he  value of land in residential  use is calculated  as a percentage  of personal  disposable  income  (net
7of indirect  taxes) weighted  according  to the degree  of urbanization  and the share of residential  capital in
determining  the remaining  components  of the property  tax base.
Established Programs Financing  (EPF).  EPF transfers are made  on an equal per capita basis to
all provinces. This program is based on the terms of the Federal-Provincial  Fiscal Arrangements  and
Federal Post-Secondary  Education  and Health Contributions  Act of 1977. The federal government  has
provided each province with a total tax abatement of  equalized  under the terms of the equalization
prograrn. Specifically,  the procedure  involves  three steps:
Step 1. Calculate  each province's  total per capita  entitlement,  which  is the same for all provinces.
It equals  the national  average  per capita federal  contribution  to shared-cost  programs  in 1975  plus $20 per
capita for Extended  Health  Care Services  (starting  in 1977),  escalated  to the current  year by the growth  in
the Canadian  economy,  as measured  by GNP per capita. Beginning  in 1986,  the rate of escalation  was
reduced  to two percentage  points below the GNP escalator.  The 1989 federal budget  reduced  the rate of
escalation  to three percentage  points below the GNP escalator.  However,  this was suppressed  by the
Expenditure  Control  Plan.  As part of the Expenditure  Control Plan, from 1990-91  to  1994-95,  the per
capita entitlement  is frozen  at its 1989-90  level. In 1994-95,  the total per capita entitlement  is $735.
Step 2.  Calculate  the per capita values of tax transfer to provinces  (13.5 percentage  points of
personal  income  tax revenue  and 1 percentage  point of corporate  income  tax revenue)  and the equalization
associated  with it. This amount  is paid  to provinces  under  the equalization  program.
Step 3.  Subtract the equalized tax transfer (amount calculated from step 2) from the total
entitlement  per capita  (calculated  in step 1),  and the remainder  is paid  to each province  in cash (Shah 1995,
p.245).
Thus, although  total per capita transfers will be the same for all provinces,  the per capita cash
transfer may differ depending  on the per capita equalized  value of the tax abatements  to provinces. In
addition,  the cash transfer  to Quebec  is reduced  by the calculated  value of the special  abatements  in lieu of
EPF cash.
Provinces  are given complete  flexibility  in the allocation  of block  transfers under EPF across the
areas covered--health  care and post-secondary  education. Provinces must, however,  adhere to federal
standards  in health care and technically  demonstrate  that federal funds have indeed  been spent within  the
designed  areas. In fact, the latter requirement  is virtually  meaningless  since the amount of the transfers
themselves  has been less than the amount of provincially funded expenditures  in these areas.  It  is
practically  impossible  to determine  the extent to which funds meant to be used for health care and post-
secondary  education  have actually contributed  to expenditures  in these areas rather than being  diverted  to
other  uses.
Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). Canada Assistance Plan  (CAP) evolved from the federal-
provincial  shared-cost  programs  that existed in the areas of old age assistance,  blind persons allowance,
disabled persons allowance,  and unemployment  assistance.  Currently, the CAP encompasses  not only
those four categories  of assistance  but also assistance  to any other persons who require  public support,
8such as needy  mothers,  dependent  children,  homes for special care, nursing  homes, homes for unmarried
mothers,  hostels for transients,  child-care  institutions,  work activity  programs, and welfare programs  for
native people.  The costs of direct financial assistance,  welfare services, and administrative  costs are
eligible  for subsidy. Capital  costs and the operating  costs of plant and equipment,  however,  are not.  The
primary advantage  of the CAP is that it leaves wide discretion to the provinces in the allocation of
expenditares  to particular  areas of social  assistance  in accordance  with provincial  circumstances.
Grants under the CAP are matching  and open-ended.  The federal  government  pays 50 percent of
all provincial  expenditures  for assistance  to persons in need and for welfare  services. Provincial  welfare
expenditLres  must meet only  a few requirements  to be eligible  for federal  grants. The provinces  must agree
to meet adequately  the basic requirements  of the recipients,  including  food, shelter,  clothing,  fuel, utilities,
househo]d  supplies,  and personal  requirements.  The only "eligibility"  requirement  is that of the individual
recipient  (as opposed  to the income  or means  test). In addition,  no residence  requirement  may be imposed
as a condition  of receiving  aid.  Provinces  are free to choose  their own rates and categories  of assistance,
since  federal  support  is completely  open-ended.
2.3. Australia
.In  Australia,  the tax bases of the federal  and lower  level  governments  (state and local  governments)
are divicled  in such a way that the federal government  receives  about two thirds of the total government
revenues. In tenns of expenditure,  however,  the federal  government  spends only one third of the total
government  revenues. This means  half of the federal  govenmment  revenues  are distributed  through  various
fomis of transfers  to the state and local govemments. As in other  westem  countries,  the Australian  federal
government  grants to lower level  governments  include  general  purpose  grants and specific  purpose  grants.
In 1994-95, about 47 percent of the total federal transfers are general purpose grants and the rest are
specific purpose grants (Rye and Searle, 1996). This section  focuses on the mechanism  of the general
purpose  transfer.
The federal grants to lower level governments  are administered  by the Commonwealth  Grants
Commission  established  in 1933. This commission  consists  of three federal  appointees. Mainly  due to its
long history, it has received  substantial attention  by scholarly  studies worldwide. The Commission  has
been commented  by foreign observers as, for example, "a model in the intemational context for the
objective  appraisal of spending  needs."(Bird,  1986). Many countries  that developed  their formula-based
transfer systems  later has adopted  methods  substantially  similar  to those used in Australia.
Currently,  the Grants Commission  distributes  general  purpose  grants using  a system  that measures
the states' fiscal capacities  and fiscal needs.5 The objective  of this system is to make it possible  for any
state with reasonable  tax efforts  to provide  the level of public  services  not substantially  below  other  states.
The formula used for  calculation the  distribution has  several alternative presentations, which are
5The  idea  to base  grant  distribution  on fiscal  needs  was  developed  in as early  as 1936.
9mathematically  equivalent. According  to one presentation,  the entitlement  to state i  can be written as
fonows:
6
entitlementi  standard  financial  assistance  + special revenue  needsi  + special expenditure
needs 3 - assessed  needs  met by specific  purpose  transfersi
where
standard  financial  assistance  = an equal per capita  grant
The amount of standard financial assistance is determined  based on the difference  between the total
expenditures  and revenues  of the states,  and adjusted  for the center's  resource  availability  for transfer. The
objective  of the standard  financial  assistance  is to close  the vertical  fiscal imbalance  (the  fact that the states'
total expenditure  is higher  than their total revenue)  for the states as a whole, without adjusting  for the
specific  needs  arising  from individual  states' revenue  and expenditure  situations.
special  revenue  needsi  = Pi (R/Ys)(YfPs -Yi/Pi)  = Pi (RJP.)[l  - (Yi/Pi)/(Y 3/Ps)]
where Pi is the population  of state i, Rs  is the total revenue  of all the states, Y, is the total tax bases of all
the states, RJYS is the national average effective tax rate (standard tax effort), P.  is the country's
population,  Y)P, is national  average  per capita tax base (standard  tax capacity),  Y, is the tax base in state
i, and Pi is the population  of state i, and YI/P 3 is per capita tax base of state i (own tax capacity).  If
(YiIPi )f(YRJP) < 1, that is, state i's tax capacity is lower than the national average, then the state will
receive  a positive  entitlement  as special  revenue  needs, and vice  versa.
Special  expenditure  needs of state i is the sum of the needs of many  expenditure  categories  of that
state. In each category,  the need  is calculated  using  the following  formula:
Pi (Ef/P.)  (yi-l)
where  Pi is the population  of state i, Es is the total expenditure  of all the states,  Es/P.  is per capita standard
expenditure.  y, is the category  disability  ratio of state i, which  measures  the extend  to which state i's need
differs  from the standard. Generally,  a state's category  disability  ratio is calculated  by combining  (usually
by multiplying but  sometimes  by  adding) individual disability factors which express relevant cost
influences  as a ratio of the Australian  average. The general  formula  for most individual  disability  factors
can be written  as:
Yi  = disability  factor of state i = (xf/Pi)/(x)PJ)
6 See  Comnmonwealh  Grants  Commission  (1996),  pp.65-66.
10where  xi amd  xY  are measures  of a cost influence  for state i and the total of the cost influence  for all states.
There are some exceptional  cases where category disability  ratios are expressed  in the equal per capita
method  or actual  per capita  method. 7
T  he 11 expenditure  categories  and the factors that used to determine  the disability  ratio in each
category  are as follows:
NVelfare:  relevant  population,  administration  scale, age/sex, dispersion,  input cost, social-
economic  composition
Cultural and recreation:  administration  scale, cross-boarder,  dispersion,  input cost, land
rights, national capital, sacred sites, social-economic  composition,  transient population,
combined  urbanization  and physical  environment
Community  development:  administration  scale, input cost, land rights, national capital,
social-economic  composition,  stage  of development,  urbanization
(General  public services: administration  scale, dispersion, expenditure  relativities,  input
cost, land  rights
Services  to industry:  administration  scale, dispersion,  expenditure  relativities,  input cost,
land rights,  physical  environment
1Eduction:  relevant population, administration  scale, age/sex, cross-boarder, dispersion,
economic  environment,  grade  cost, input cost, physical  environment,  service  delivery  scale,
social-economic  composition,  urbanization,  vandalism  and security
Hlealth:  administration  scale, cross-boarder,  dispersion,  inpatient  services,  input cost, non-
inpatient  services,  combined  age/sex  and social  economic  composition
Law,  order  and  public  safety: relevant population, administration scale,  age/sex,
commonwealth  offenders, cross-boarder, dispersion, input cost,  land rights, national
capital, physical environment, service delivery scale,  social-economic  composition,
transient population,  urbanization,  vandalism  and security, combined  age/sex and social
economic  composition
Transport: administration  scale, dispersion, input cost, land rights, road length, road
usage,  social economic  composition
Economic affairs and  other purposes: administration scale, dispersion, expenditure
r  elativities,  input cost, physical  environment,  social-economic  composition
7 See  IRye  and Searle  (1996)  for details.
11Trading enterprises: relevant population, administrative  scale, expenditure  relativities,
input cost, interest, land rights, physical environment,  service delivery scale, social
economic  composition,  urbanization,  vandalism  and security
The main difference  between  the Australia model  and that used in Canada is that the Australian
model  takes both expenditure  needs and fiscal capacities  into account,  while  the Canadian  model  considers
revenues  only.
It was decided  in 1988  that every  five years the Grants Comrnission  would  conduct  a major review
of the existing  grant distribution  method. The first such review  took place in 1993. Between  two major
reviews,  the Grants Commission  updates the coefficients  used in the formula  based on most recent data.
These  data are often  calculated  as moving  averages  of the last three  years.
2.4. Germany
Compared  with other countries,  a unique  feature of the German  tax assignment  is that all major
taxes are shared  by the federal  and state governments.  These  shared  taxes include  the personal  income  tax,
corporate  income  tax, and VAT. Altogether  these shared  taxes amount  to about  two thirds of tax revenues
in the country. The main federal  taxes are the excises  on mineral  oil, tobacco,  and alcohol  (except  beer).
The states only  have minor  taxes such as the motor  vehicle  tax and net wealth  tax.  The local governments
levy  property  taxes and receive  income  from user charges. In 1990,  about 64 percent  of the state revenues
came from shared  taxes and 15 percent from federal  grants. For the local governments,  30 percent of their
revenues  came  from shared  taxes and 22 percent  from federal  grants. 8
If revenue  sharing is included,  Gennany has three schemes  of intergovernmental  transfer:  revenue-
sharing,  the interstate  equalization  payments,  and the supplementary  grants. All these  transfer schemes  are
administered  by the Ministry  of Finance.
Revenue  sharing. VAT sharing  is the most important  tax sharing  arrangement  in Germany  and is
primarily  an equalization  scheme. Currently,  44 percent  of VAT is assigned  to the states. Among  this, 75
percent  of the state share of VAT is distributed  to states  on an equal per capita  basis--a measure  that is of
course equalizing.  The remaining  25 percent are distributed  to states with below-average  tax capacity (per
capita revenues)  to enable them to achieve  92 percent of the national average. In addition to the VAT
sharing,  42.5 percent  of the personal  income  tax and 50 percent  of the corporate  income  tax are distributed
to the states. But these  two taxes are shared  on the basis of derivation,  thus having  no equalization  effect.
Interstate equalization  payments.  The direct transfer scheme, named interstate equalization
payments,  were first introduced  in Germany  in 1951  as a form of compensation  for the "special  burdens"
bome by certain  states with respect  to refugees,  harbor maintenance,  and so on.  In 1955,  these payments
8See  Spahn  (1995),  p.  141.
12were given a constitutional  basis in Article 107, which provided  that the revenue  received  by the states
should be adjusted  to offset differences  in their tax capacity, although  still with some allowance  for the
special  burdens  facing  particular  states. The federal  law currently  regulating  these interstate  transfers --the
Financial  Settlement  Act--was  passed  in 1969  and revised  in 1977  (Bird, 1986).
Currently,  the interstate  equalization  formula  is as follows  (Shah, 1994a):
Ei  = ATCi -NEEDi
where AlTCi  is the adjusted  taxable capacity  of state  i, and NEEDi  is the fiscal  need  of state i.9 If Ei>0  then
state i contributes  to the equalization  pool; if E 1<O,  then  it receives  transfer  from  the pool.
Fiscal capacity,  or adjusted  taxable  capacity  is defined  as:
ATCi  = TCi -SBi
where TC, is taxable capacity and SB, is special burden of state i.  Taxable capacity is calculated  by
adding  revenues  from state taxes, the state's share of the joint taxes according  to local yields,  and half the
property and trade taxes of municipalities  according to local yields and uniform assessments.  The
disbursernent  of the transfers to the states are initially based on taxable capacities using forecasted  tax
bases, bu,t  an adjustment  is made  when actual  figures of the tax bases become  available. Special  burden is
the deduction  to be made  for extraordinary  expenditures  facing  a particular state. It is constant  in Deutsche
Mark terms  and is embedded  in the Law of Fiscal  Equalization." 0
EExpenditure  need  is defined  by
NqEEDi  = (EiTC,/IiPOPi)(PDCXPOPi)
where  :iTCi/EiPOPi  is the national average per capita revenue, POPi is the population of state i.
I,TC1/IiPOPi is used as a proxy of per capita standard  expenditure  need. PDCi is the weighted  population
index of the state i.  For city states, the weight is 1.35; for municipalities,  the weights are graduated
between 1.0 and 1.3 (according  to the population of the municipalities). Note that this approach to
determining  "need"  is much simpler that those used in Australia or Japan and, as a result, the German
interstate  transfer system  is nearly  a pure revenue  equalization  scheme.
9 Prol. Paul Bemrd  Spahn  of University  of Frankfiut  refers  to NEEDS  in this equation  as "fiscal  yardstick,"
because the method  to detenmine  NEEDS considers  very few factors  and, as a result,  the interstate  transfer
system  is almost  a pure  revenue  equalization  scheme.
10  Tbehre  is only one important  category-the  maintnance of harbors-in determining  the special  burden.
Correspondence  with  Prof.  Paul Bemnd  Spaim.
13Supplementary grants.  In addition  to the VAT sharing and interstate equalization  scheme,  the
federal  government  offers additional  grants to the states. These  include:  grants to lift up financially  weak
states (east and west) to 90 percent  of the average  fiscal capacity,  about DM 5 billion in 1996; grants to
Eastem States at a minimum  of DM 14 billion a year, until the year of 2004; grants to some financially
weak  Westem States  to compensate  partly for the revenue  losses  due to the integration  of the Eastern  States
into the interstate  equalization  scheme,  at DM 1.2 billion  each year, for a ten year period; grants to the
States  of Bremen  and Saarland  to help  them deal with debt service  problems,  at DM 3.4 billion,  from 1994
to 1998;  grants  to some smaller  Eastern  and Western  states  at DM 1.5 billion  each year.
Upon the German  unification,  in 1990,  the states in the Western Germany  refused to accept the
Eastem states to join the interstate equalization  program.  Accepting  the Eastern states meant all the
recipient  states in the west would  become  contributing  states. As a compromise,  the German  Unity Fund
was established  to assist  the poor Eastern states. This fund  had DM16.1 billion  and was distributed  to the
Eastern states during 1990-95. Sources  of the fund include  contributions  from the federal  government  (5
billion),  the states' budgets  (1.6 billion),  and borrowing  from the capital market. The fund is distributed  to
the states based on an equal per capita basis, and 40 percent of these distributions  must be further
distributed  to the municipalities  (Spahn  1995). This temporary  program  was terminated  by the end of 1995
and currently  all the Eastern  states  are incorporated  in the standard  equalization  schemes.
The following  table shows the significant equalization  effects of the three transfer schemes.
According  to an estimate  for 1996,  the Western  states'  per capita  own revenue  will be DM 3705, while  that
of the Eastern States  will be DM 2030. After equalization,  the Western States'  per capita revenue  will be
DM 5510, and that of the Eastern  States  will be DM 5190.
T  able 2.3. Per Capita Revenue  Relative  to the National  Average  before  and after Transfers:  Estimates  for
1996
Own  Revenue  After  Interstate  Supplementary
VAT sharing  Equalization  Grants
Western  States  11%  5%  2%  1%
Eastern States  -39%  -18%  -7%  -5%
Source:  Data provided  by Prof.  Wolfgang  Fottingger.
2.5. The United Kingdom
Unlike  federally  structured  states such as American,  Canada,  and Gennany,  the United  Kingdom  is
a unitary state in which  local governments  derive  their powers  and functions  from the central  government.
The central  government  can, at any time, by the ordinary  process  of legislation,  change  the powers  of local
authorities  or abolish  them  altogether.
14The local government  system  in the United  Kingdom  experienced  several  phases of re-organization
over the past decades. It was reorganized  by the Local Government  Acts in 1972  (for England  and Wales)
and 1973  for Scotland. These  acts created  a two-tier  local government  system. The largest  units of local
government  were the county  councils  or, in Scotland,  the regional  councils.
Within the geographical  area they covered were district councils. In 1985, the Local Government  Act
abolished  the county  councils  of London  and the major cities,  and transferred  most of their functions  to the
lower tier district councils. In 1991,  the British government  re-examined  this structure and the reviews
undertak:en  has led the government  to favor a general  more  towards  single-tier  authorities  in order to reduce
bureaucracy  and cost and improve  the coordination  and quality  of services. However,  no concrete  measure
has been.  taken in this direction.
The central government  retains almost all major taxes--e.g.,  personal  income  tax and corporate
income tax--except  the council tax (local residential  property tax).  Revenue  for local authority in the
United Kingdom  can be grouped under three broad heads: grants-in-aid  from the central government,
property  tax, fees and charges  on services  provided  by local governments-trading  profits, rent, interest  and
miscellaneous  charges--of  which the largest component  is council  house rents.  Grants from the central
government  are necessary  because  the division  of tax powers  between  levels  of government  leaves  the local
authoriti.es  with very limited  fiscal  resources.
There are basically  two types of grants: general  purpose grants and specific  purpose grants. The
general purpose  grant has existed since 1929. In 1967, it was renamed  the Rat Support  Grant (RSG);  in
1990,  it was renamed  the Revenue  Support  Grant; and this system  continues  to operate  today. The general
purpose  grants are mainly  used to address  the issue of regional  inequality.  The higher  the ratio of need  to
resources available  to a particular local authority, the more grant aid it receives. The specific purpose
grants are used to address  the spill-over  or externality  effect of specific  projects,  such as roads, education,
and social  welfare."
In the fiscal year of 1995-96,  the amount  of general  purpose  transfers amounted  to about 28 billion
pounds,  including  10 billion  of non-domestic  rate (tax on business  properties,  or business  tax, collected  by
the local authorities,  remitted  to a national pool, and than transferred  back to localities based on their
populations  and a common  amount  per head of population.)  and 18 billion  of RSG, the main equalization
transfer. In the same  year,  the specific  purpose grants totaled  approximately  16  billion  pounds,  including  4
billions of matching grants to programs such as  subsidies to handicapped  and mentally-illed  people,
teachers  training programs,  and 12 billions  on agency  delegated  functions  such as living  expense  subsidies
to students  in high education,  housing  benefits  to low income  people,  etc. The  matching  grants use various
different  matching  rates,  examples  of which  are 50 percent,  60 percent,  and 100  percent  from  the center.
The Revenue Support  Grant. RSG assumes overwhelming  importance  within the provision of
general purpose grants.  The formula used calculate  the entitlement  of each locality consists of three
" These  arrangnents, as described  in this and the following  paragraphs,  operate  within  England.  There  are
similar  but separate  arrangements  within  Wales  and Scotland.  Northern  Ireland  has a different  system,  reflecting
the limited  functions  of the local  authonties  there.
15elements:  Standard  Spending  Assessment,  which  measures  the locality's  expenditure  needs;  standard local
tax income,  which measures  the locality's  tax capacity;  and income  from non-domestic  rates, another type
of transfer  from  the center. The  formula  is as follows:
RSG = SSA - standard local tax income - income from NDR
RSG is distributed so that if all local authorities  were to spend at the level of their SSA then
broadly  the same  level of council  tax could  be set in all areas for dwellings  in the same  valuation  band (of
local residential  properties). Consequently  RSG equalizes  for the differences  in assessed costs between
areas (the SSAs)  leaving  council  tax payers everywhere  able to pay broadly  the same council  tax for their
valuation  band and receive  the same  standard  of service.
An Standard Spending Assessments (SSA) is  the national government's  assessment of  the
appropriate  amount  of revenue  expenditure  which  would  allow  the authority  to provide  a standard  level of
service,  consistent  with the government's  view of the appropriate  amount of revenue  expenditure  for all
local authorities. The calculation  of an authority's  SSA follows  general principles  applied equally to all
authorities  and takes account of each authority's demographic,  geographic,  and social characteristics.
Differences  in SSAs between authorities  with the same service responsibilities  are thus due solely to
differences  in their underlying  characteristics.
The standard  local tax income is calculated  based on the centrally-set  rates on local residential
property  tax (e.g., 551.55  per band D dwelling)  and the previous  year's  local tax base reported  by the local
authority. Income  from Non-domestic  Rates (NDR) is another type of transfer, the standard  amount of
which is 233.95 per head.  The RSG formula is in effect calculating  the gap between the standard
expenditure  needs  and the revenues  sources  (including  transfer  from DNR income)  of a locality.
The most complicated  part is the calculation  of SSA.  SSA of each locality is broke down into
seven fields  of expenditure  need. These  seven fields  are education,  social services,  highway  maintenance,
police,  fire, capital  expenditure  (debt  payment  for principal  and interest)  and other  services. Other services
mainly  include  local planning  and development  control,  collection  of council  tax, administration  of housing
benefits, museums, parking control, local support for the arts, registration  of voting, libraries, local
(Magistrates)  courts, subsidies  for buses,  garbage  disposal  and collection. For each  of these  seven blocks,
there  are many  elements  (factors)  that should  be considered  to determine  the amount  of need.
Education
--Number  of school  pupils
--Number of school pupils who have special needs (pupils bom outside the United
Kingdom and English as the second language, children from single parent families,
children  from low income  families,  etc.)
--Free meals  (children  from  low income  families)
--Cost differentials across regions (average earning--reflecting  wage level for school
teachers,  property  cost--reflecting  rent  for school  buildings,  sparsity-reflecting  the need  to
subsidize  children  who  travel distance  to schools)
16Highway  Maintenance
--The length  of existing  roads of different  types (major  road versus  small  roads)
--Cost adjustment  factors (mainly  wage level)
Social  Services
There  are three sub-blocks:
Age structure
--Number  of elderly  people  (over 65, 75 and 85. Each category  has a different  weight,  and
the relative  weights are: 1 for people of age 65-74, 5 for people of age 75-84, 21 for
people  of age 85-)
Children
--Number  of children  of single  parent  families
--Number  of children  with low income  families
--Number  of children  living  in rented  accommodations
--Number  of children  of homeless  families
--Population  of non-white  ethic  minorities
Other Social  Services
--Population  between  age 18-64
--Number  of mentally  ill people
--Number  of physically  handicapped  people
--Population  living  in overcrowded  accommodations
--Population  living  in rented  accommodations
--Families  sharing  properties  with others
--Population  of ethnic  minorities
Fire
--Resident  population  in the area
--Number  of fires last year
--Density  of population
--Properties  of high risk (e.g., chemical  plants)
--Length  of coastal  line in the area
Police
17--Population  in the area
--Number  of calls  to police  in the previous  year
--Number  of crime  in the previous  year
-Volume of traffic
--Population  living  in overcrowded  accommodations
--Population  living  in rented  accommodations
--Families  sharing  properties  with others
-Population density
--Road length




--Area cost (average  wage  and rent)
Capital  Expenditure
-Principal and interest  repayrnent  for the amount  of debt  allowed  by the center
The assessment  of local expenditure  need in each field  is based on a formnula  that incorporates  the
respective  factors. Most  formulas  consists  of a client  group (measurement  unit) multiplied  by the unit cost
for the client  group. For example,  the number  of students  is the client  group and per student  expenditure  is
the unit cost in the case of education. Adjustments  are made to some assessments  to take account of the
differences  in the extra cost of providing  a service which result from variations in additional  needs (cost
adjustment).  For some assessments,  regression  analysis  has been  used to determine  the relative  weights  of
the factors in the formulas  (Department  of the Environment,  1995). For others, weights  are assigned  based
on the designers'  judgement  and their consultation  with local authorities.
2.6. India
Intergovernmental  fiscal  transfers from the central  government  to the states in India  go as far back
as 1919,  and experienced  many  changes  since  the independence  of India  in 1947. As in other  countries,  the
purposes of India's  fiscal transfer system today include correcting  vertical fiscal imbalances  between  the
federal and the states  and correcting  horizontal  imbalances  in fiscal capacity  among  the states. These  two
aims are not always independent  of each other and have both been integrated  into the actual operation  of
the system.
The indian intergovernmental  transfer system consists of three elements:  (1) A general purpose
grants mechanism  designed  to assist the backward  areas using states' shares  of income  taxes and excise  tax
(a revenue-sharing  scheme). This system is operated by the Finance Commission. Transfers via the
18Finance  Commissions  declined  from  65 percent  during 1969-74  to 58 percent  of total net  transfers  in 1992-93
(World  Bank 1995,  p.44).  (2) Transfers  from the federal  government  to state development  plans. Such
transfers  are  authorized  by  the  Planning  Commission,  whose  major  responsibilities  include  formulating  national
five-year  plan  as well  as annual  plans. The  plan  transfers  consist  of formula-based  unconditional  transfers  and
specific  purpose  transfers  some of which  are matching  grants.  In 1992-93.  transfers  authorized  by the
Planning  Commnission  amounted  to 38 percent  of the total transfers  (World  Bank 1995,  p.45). (3) Local
government  borrowing  authorized  by the central  government.  These  are  not transfers  in the stnct sense.
T  he following  table  provides  a summary  of the relative  magnitude  of the  three  types  of transfers.
Table  2.4. The  Composition  (%/o)  of Transfers  from  the Center  to the  States,  1969-93
Finance  Commission  Planning  Commission  Other
Transfers  Transfers  Transfers
Fourth  Plan  64.6  24.4  11.0
(1969-74)
Seventh  Plan  61.0  35.1  3.1
(1985-90)
1992-93  58.9  38.3  2.7
Source:  World  Bank (1995),  p.45.
lhe Finance  Cmmiissiox,  which  is appointed  every  five  years,  is the agency  that suggests  the method
for allocating  the transfers  based  on revenue-sharing.  It is not a standing  body,  however;  it is dissolved  after
it has mnade  the recommendation  on transfer  formula.  Since  the independence  of India,  there  have  been  ten
Finance  Commissions,  and the transfer  formula  suggested  by the Tenth  Finance  Commission  will  cover  the
period 1995-2000  (Gurumurthi  1995). Currently,  the pool used for transfers allocated  by the Finance
Commission  consists  of 85 percent  of income  tax and 45 percent  of union  excise  duty. The tenth  Finance
Commission  has proposed  that for fiscal  year 1995-96  the pool  includes  47.5 percent  of the reformed  union
excise  duly (MODVAT)  and 77.5  percent  of income  tax.
On the distribution  method,  all the commissions  up to the Eighth Finance  Commission  (1984)
followed  what is known  as the "gap-filling"  approach. This consists  of assessing  the revenue  receipts  and
expenditure  based  on the actual  numbers  and recommending  non-plan  deficit  grants  to fill  the financing  gaps
arrived at on this basis. This approach  has encouraged  the state governments  to understate  the predicted
growth  oF  their own  tax revenues,  to increase  their  commitments  on non-plan  expenditure,  and to run deficit
budgets  in the  expectation  that  their  financing  gaps would  be filled  by grants  from  the Finance  Commission.
Apart from encouraging  inefficiency,  this approach  also resulted  in relatively  better  off states  qualfing for
such  grants  while  some  poor  states  were  not eligible  (Gurumurthi  1995).
he tenth  Finance  Commission  has suggested  that the allocation  adopt  the following  new  criteria:  (a)
20  percent  on  the  basis  on  population;  (b) 60 percent  on distance  of per capita  income  from  the  highest  income
19major state; (c) 5 percent on the basis of infrastructure;  (d) 5 percent on the basis of the area of states
subject  to certain  normative  limits;  and (e) 10 percent  on the basis of tax effort  defined  as the ratio of per
capita  own tax revenue  to the square  of per capita  income. This formula  differs from  the previous  ones by
reducing  (for income  taxes) the weight  of population;  increasing  the weight  given  to "distance"  of per capita
income;  introducing  a weight  for infrastructure;  and removing  the "gap filling  weight."  (World  Bank, 1995,
p.57) It is expected  that this fornula will  strengthen  the redistribution  function  of the Finance  Commission
transfers.
The detailed  procedure  for applying  the above  formula  is as follows:12
Step 1. Divide  the whole  pool for transfers into  five  parts, 20%, 60%, 5%/6,  5%, 10%.
Step 2.  Allocate  20 percent of the pool on the basis of population. That is, the ith state
gets P,/P  of the 20 percent,  where  Pi is the ith state's  population,  and P is the country's  total
population. The population  figures  used are those in the 1971  Census.
Step 3.  Allocate  60 percent of the pool on the basis on income  distance. The respective
"distances"  are multiplied  by the population  of the states and the share of each state is
obtained  by dividing  the product for that state by the sum of the products for all states.
That is, the ith state gets PiDI£jPjDj  of the 60 percent, where Pi is the ith state's
population,  and Di is the per capita  income  distance  of the ith state from the state with the
highest  per capita income  (Goa in the case of the Tenth Commission).  Goa is taken to be
the same as for the state with the second  highest  per capita income  (Punjab)  from that of
the next one (Maharashtra)  since  otherwise  Goa will  not get any share  at all.
Step 4.  Allocate  5 percent  of the pool on the basis on area, i.e., the ith state gets A,/A of
the 5 percent, where A, is the ith state's area, and A is the country's  total area.  An
adjustment  is however  made so that no state gets a share higher  than 10 percent or less
than 2 percent.
Step 5. 5 percent  for infrastructure  is on the basis of an aggregate  index  computed  by
an expert group. The details are given  in Appendix  5 to the Tenth Commission's
report.
Step 6.  10 percent  for tax effort is allocated  using  the ratio of per capita  own tax revenue
to the square of per capita income  with the respective  products being  scaled  by population
as in the distance  criterion. That is, the ith state gets PiEi/EjPjE  of the 10  percent  where E,
is the ith state's  effort  index  defined  as E, = (R,fP,)/(Y,/P,) 2.
12  The author  would  like  to thank  Mr. S. Guhan  for providing  me with  detailed  information  on the Finance
Commission  formula.
20T  he formula  based plan  transfers operated  by the Planning  Commission  consist  of about  30 percent
grants and 70 percent  loans. These grants and loans are distributed  as packages  to the state governments
based on a formula,  that is, the amount  allocated  to any recipient  state includes  30 percent  of grant and 70
percent loan; the state cannot  just accept  the grant without  accepting  the loan.  The formula  used by the
Planning  Commission  to allocate  the transfers  is as follows:
Distribution  is made with 60 percent weight for population, 25 percent for per capita state
domestic  product (SDP), 7.5 percent for fiscal management  (include speed of utilization  of committed
foreign  aid and the state's performance  of revenue  collection),  and another  7.5 percent  for special  problems
of states (  using  indicators  of population  control,  literacy,  and land reform). Of funds  allocated  on the basis
of 25 percent weight  attached  to per capita SDP, 20 percent is given  only to states  with less than average
per capita SDP on the basis of the inverse  formula;  and the remaining  5 percent  according  to the "distance
formula."  The  inverse  formula  is given  by:
(:P.ti)/Z(Pi/Yi)
which is inversely  related  to the per capita income  of a state.  The distance  formula  is expressed  as:
(yh-yi)Pi/l(yh-yi)Pi
where Y, and Yh  denote  per capita SDP of the ith and the richest state, Pi, the population  of the ith state
(Yh-Yi)  in the case of the "h" state is computed  as the difference  between  the highest  and the next highest
per capita SDP. This indicator  increases  as a state's distance  from the richest state increases. These two
formulas  are clearly  redistributive,  but the weights  given  to them in the overall  allocation  formula  are rather
limited.
T  he application  procedure  of the Planning  Commission  formula is similar to that of the Finance
Commission  formula.  The 20 percent for per capita SDP distributed  under the inverse formula and 5
percent under the distance formula are scaled by population.  7.5 percent for perfonnance  takes into
account (a) tax effort (b) fiscal management  and (c) progress  in respect of national  objectives. The latter
have beeni  specified as population control and maternal and child health; universalization  of primary
education.  and adult education;  timely completion  of externally-aided  projects; and land reforms. The 7.5
per  cent for special problems is allocated on the basis of the Planning Commission's  discretionary
determination  at the annual  plan discussions  with the States.
Some studies  have shown  that the transfer  operated  by the Finance  Commission  has been strongly
redistributive,  in the sense  that the distribution  is highly  negatively  correlated  with per capita  income  of the
states. But the redistributive  role of the plan transfers is relatively  weak (Sato, 1992),  and in some  years,
the plan transfers  might  even  be progressive,  i.e, favoring  high-income  states rather  than low-income  states.
It has also been suggested  by some scholars that the two main transfer schemes  are not coordinated  and
even  contradictory  in their objectives,  and should  be consolidated  into one.
212.7. Japan1 3
As in many  other  countries,  the fiscal relations  between  the central  and local  governments  in Japan
are markedly a vertical financial imbalance. In recent years, the central government  has received  tax
revenues  that exceeded  its expenditure,  while the local governments  have received  less than the amount
needed  to perform  their functions. This imbalance  can  be seen  from Table 2.5, which  presents  the relative
share of all tax revenues  and expenditures  of the two levels  of government.  As suggested  by the table, the
central  government  has collected  more  than 60 percent  of the total tax revenue  every  fiscal year since 1970,
while  it has expended  less  than 35 percent  of the total tax revenue.
Table 2.5. Vertical  Fiscal  Imbalance  (in percent)
Tax Revenue  Received  by  Tax Revenue  Spent by
National  Local  National  Local
1970  67.5  32.5  33.7  66.3
1980  64.1  35.9  23.1  76.9
1989  64.2  35.8  34.9  65.1
Source:  Yonehara  (1993).
Transfers from the central government  to the local governments  are the primary  means  to address
the vertical imbalance,  i.e., the gap between  local governments'  tax revenues  and their expenditures. In
Japan, there are five types of transfers from the central government  to local governments:  the local
allocation  tax, central  government  disbursement,  local transfer  taxes, special traffic safety disbursements,
and transfers as a substitution  for fixed-assets  tax.  Of these  transfers, the local allocation  tax and central
government  disbursements  are the most important,  and comprise  about 90 percent of the total transfers
from the central govermment  to  local governments.  The local allocation tax  is  allocated to  local
governments  to equalize  their fiscal  capacity  and to ensure  sufficient  funds for the public services  that local
governments  are required  to provide. The number  of central  government  disbursement  programs  exceeds
one thousand.  These disbursements  cover almost all fields of local government  activities including
education,  social  welfare,  public works,  transportation,  and regional  development.  The local transfer  taxes
are levied  by the central  government,  which  imposes  them as local rather  than as central  taxes. The central
government  collects  these taxes on behalf of local governments  because of advantages  in assessment  and
collection. In a sense, local transfer taxes can be viewed  as local taxes that are delegated  to the central
government  for their collection. The remaining  part of this subsection  discusses in detail how local
allocation  tax, central  government  specific  purpose  disbursements,  and local transfer  tax are implemented.
Local Allocation  Tax: An Equalization  Scheme
This section  is based  on Ma (1994),  Yonehara  (1993),  Fujiwara  (1992),  and  Ishi (1993).
22The local allocation tax  aims to  equalize the fiscal capacities of  local governments by
supplementing  the shortage  of their tax revenues. This tax enables  local governments  to provide  public
services  aLt  the standard level prescribed  by the central government. When a local government  does not
maintain the level prescribed  for public services,  or has paid an excessive  amount for the services,  the
central  government  may  reduce  the local allocation  tax for that local government.
Compared  to other transfer schemes,  the local allocation  tax is the only equalization  scheme  in
Japan.  klt  is allocated both to prefectures  and municipalities  in the same way.  Table 2.6 presents the
distribution of the local allocation tax to  prefectures and municipalities. The amount allocated to
prefectures  is slightly  larger  than the amount  allocated  to municipalities.
Table 2.6. Distribution  of Local  Allocation  Tax among  Prefectures  (Per Capita base, in Yen), 1989
Index  of  Per Capita  Per Capita  (A)+(B)
Fiscal  Tax Revenue  Allocation  Tax
Capacity  (A)  (B)
High-capacity  group
Tokyo  1.527  324,898  ...  324,898
Osaka  1.102  145,185  ...  145,185
Aichi  1.075  143,109  ...  143,109
Kanagawa  1.051  115,614  ...  115,614
Low-capacity  group
Kochi  0.224  58,973  192,572  253,545
Shimane  0.227  66,898  205,484  272,379
Aomori  0.244  54,837  152,677  207,514
Akita  0.250  59,201  160,437  219,638
Source:  Yonehara  (1993).
The local allocation  tax is distributed  mainly (94 percent)  as an ordinary  allocation  tax and partly
(6 percent) as a special allocation  tax.  The ordinary  allocation  tax is paid to local governments  whose
basic fiscal needs exceed  their basic fiscal revenue. Generally,  local governments  located  within large
metropolilAn  areas have strong fiscal capacity compared with those in  rural areas.  Among the 47
prefectures,  in fiscal year 1989,  Tokyo had the highest  index  of fiscal capacity  followed  by Osaka,  Aichi,
and Kangawa  prefectures. The low-capacity  groups are Kochi, Shimane,  Aomori,  and Akita prefectures
(in ascenc[ing  order of index  fiscal capacity). The strong prefectures  receive  no allocation  tax, while the
low-capacity  prefectures  receive  a large per-capita  allocation  tax.  In Table 2.6, the top four prefectures
and the bottom  four prefectures  in the ranking  of fiscal capacity  index  are listed  for comparison.
Mathematically,  the formula  to calculate  the local allocation  tax transfer  to a locality  is:
Transfer = Basic fiscal needs (N) - Basic fiscal revenues (R).
23However,  the total amount  of the ordinary  allocation  tax, which is calculated  in advance,  does not
necessarily  cover  the aggregate  amount  of the deficiencies  of local governments  whose  basic needs  exceed
their basic revenues. This being  the case, some modification  is necessary  in the calculation  of the total
allotted  amount  by using  an adjustment  coefficient  a.  The  actual amount  of ordinary  allocation  tax to local
governments is
Actual transfer = N - R - aN
where a  is chosen in such a way that the total amount of the actual transfers equal the predetermined
amount.
Basic fiscal need is a  standardized  amount necessary to provide public services at the level
prescribed  by the central  government. The total fiscal need of a local government  is the sum of the basic
fiscal need  for each item of public service. These services  include  the operating  and maintaining  of police
departments,  fire departments,  schools to provide compulsory  education,  as well as the construction  of
parks, roads, and bridges. In the calculation,  "needs"  do not have  to correspond  to actual expenditures  by
specific  local governments,  rather, reasonable  and standard  fiscal needs are calculated  based the average
condition  of a "model  local  government."
At present, the model local government  is conceived  of as a prefecture  with population  of 1.7
million  and an area of 6900 square kilometers.  Similarly,  the hypothetical  municipality  is assumed  to have
100,000  people and an area of 160 square kilometers. In each case, a standard level and range of basic
fiscal needs  and revenues  are assumed. In calculating  the fiscal needs  of a real local government,  the fiscal
activities  of the government  is divided  into six categories. In the case of prefectures,  the categories  are:
police,  public  works, education,  welfare  and labor, industry  and economy,  and the administrative  functions.
For each item, the basic fiscal needs are calculated  according  to the following  equation, and the fiscal
needs  of a local government  is the total needs  for all the services.
Basic fiscal  need  = unit  of measurement  x modification  coefficient
x unit cost.
In this equation,  the unit of measurement  is a figure  that provides  an appropriate  measure  for the cost of a
particular service.  For example,  the number of police necessary  for police protection,  the number of
residents  requiring  fire protection,  or the length  and area of roads within  a district are examples  of units of
measurement. The basic fiscal need for a particular category is first calculated  for a single unit of
measurement  for the model local government  case.  Because the cost of providing public services is
affected  by various factors such  as geographical,  social, economic,  and institutional  characteristics  of each
locality,  modification  coefficients  are applied  to the equation  to adjust for these factors. The unit costs are
calculated  each fiscal year, taking into account the change  in price levels and the change  in the people's
demand  for the particular  public service.
It is necessary  to explain  further  the nature of the modification  coefficients.  Without  modification,
the results of the basic financial  needs  calculations  would  not always be precise,  because  they reflect  only
24aggregate  figures of all indicators  multiplied  by unit costs, which is considerably  different  from the real
picture. For example,  when  population  is used as an indicator,  the greater  the population,  the less the cost
per unit.  Likewise,  unit costs must differ from one area to another must often be modified. Currently,
modification  coefficients  are classified  according  to the following  eight  categories:
1. Class modification  coefficients.  A typical  example  is in calculating  the financial  needs  of a high
school. T'he  indicator  for a high school  is the number  of its students. However,  educational  expenses  are
likely  to differ depending  on the types of school  (i.e., academic,  engineering,  agricultural). In such cases,
class modification  coefficients  are applied  to adjust  for differences  in unit costs.
2. Size modification  coefficient. When economies  of scale occur in the provision of public
services,  lower unit costs should  be applied  to local governments  with larger population. For example,  the
per capita.  cost of hiring  a mayor  is smaller  in a larger city  than in a small city. For such adjustments,  size
modification  coefficients  are used.
3  Density  modification  coefficients. The unit costs of some services  decrease as the population
increases. For example,  the unit cost (per capita cost) of a hospital  is lower  in a city with a population  of
100,000  than in a town with a population  of 1,000. The density  modification  coefficients  are used for such
adjustments.
4. Modification  coefficients  for special factors.  These coefficients  are designed  to adjust for
differences  in unit costs that vary according  to factors such as degree of urbanization,  salary level, and
housing  allowance.
5. Modification  coefficient  for cold areas.  This coefficient  is used to reflect  higher  unit costs in
cold  areas due to additional  expenses  on heating  systems,  consumption  of fuels,  etc.
6. Modification  coefficients  to allow for rapid increases in the units of measurement. This
coefficieni:  is used to reflect  the increase  in basic fiscal  needs  such as city planning  that ,would  occur in case
of rapid  increase  in population.
7. Modification  coefficients  related  to rapid decreases  in the units of measurenment.  This coefficient
is applied,  for example,  to minimize  any sharp reductions  of the local allocation  tax thAt  would  occur  in the
case  of a rapid  decrease  in the population  of a municipality.
8. Modification  coefficients  related  to financial  capacity. This coefficient  is applied  to reflect  the
higher  fiscal needs  of localities  with higher  debt service  ratios.
Basic  fiscal revenue  is defined  as general revenue  that can be appropriated  to meet the basic fiscal
need. It is the sum of the local transfer  tax (which  will  be discussed  below)  and a prescribed  percentage  of
the standardized  local tax revenue--80  percent for prefectures, and 75 percent for municipalities. The
standardized  local tax revenue  is calculated  by summing  the products of local tax bases and the standard
local tax rates prescribed  by the center.  Note that the basic fiscal revenue  is not simply  the total tax
revenue. There  are two reasons  for adopting  such  prescribed  percentages.  First, it is impossible  to measure
25completely  the basic financial needs of all local governments  by a  uniform formula.  Many local
governments  have  their own  peculiar  fiscal  needs  requiring  a certain  amount  of tax revenues. Second,  it is
necessary  to retain incentives  for local governments  to collect  their own taxes.  If total tax revenue  was
included  in the calculation  of basic fiscal revenue,  any increase  in local tax revenue  would reduce  the local
allocation  tax by the same amount, and this would serve as a disincentive  for the local governments  to
collect taxes.  On the other hand, all revenues  allotted from the local transfer tax are included,  mainly
because it is collected  by the national  govemnment  and has no relation  to the tax collection  efforts at the
local level.
The local allocation  tax is essentially  a tax-sharing  grant. Article 6 of the Local Allocation  Tax
Law provides  that this tax be the sum of specified  percentages  of major national  taxes: 24 percent of the
consumption  tax, 25 percent of tobacco tax, and 32 percent of income  tax, corporate  tax, and the liquor
tax.  These  percentages,  however,  are flexible. Paragraph  2 of Article  6(3) provides  that if the amount  of
the local allocation  tax is defficient,  these  percentages  may be increased. In fact, when  the local allocation
tax was introduced  in 1954,  it consisted  only of 20 percent  of income  tax, corporation  tax, and the liquor
tax.
The special local allocation  tax compensates  for shortfalls  in the ordinary local allocation  tax.
Transfers  are made  in the following  circumstances:
(1) When there are special fiscal needs not included in the basic fiscal needs.  Examples are
expenditures  for local assembly  elections  (which  take place every four years), for protection  of historical
properties,  or for natural disaster  relief.
(2)  When  local government  tax-revenue  estimates  (estimated  by the central  government)  are greater
than actual  local  tax revenue. Overestimates  of local tax revenue  result in a decrease  in the local allocation
tax, and the shortfall  is supplied  by the special  local allocation  tax.
(3) When there are unforeseeable  local government  financial  needs not included  in the ordinary
allocation  tax arise. Ordinary  local allocation  tax is detennined  before  the end of August, but sometimes
substantial  fiscal  needs arise  afterwards. Such  cases result  in transfer  by a special  local  allocation  tax.
Central  Govermnent  Disbursements:  Specific  Purpose  Grants
The most important instrument  the central government  has to influence  the structure of local
expenditures is  the  central government specific purpose disbursements.  These disbursements  are
distributed  under  the condition  that the recipient  follows  the directives  issued  by the central  government. If
a  local government  fails to observe central government  directives,  it may be requested  to  refund the
disbursement  in whole  or in part.
The basic principle that underlies  the central government  control is uniformity  throughout the
country. The central government  seeks  to standardize  local taxation  as well as the distribution  of public
services.  As a policy, the central government  tries to treat all local governments  equally.  When a
26department  of the central  government  distributes  a specific-purpose  disbursement,  it takes great care not to
discriminate  against  any local government.
The specific  purpose  disbursements  from the central  government  constitute  a fairly large portion  of
the total revenue  of local governments.  For prefecture  governments,  the disbursements  constitute  about 17
percent of their total revenue  in 1989. If we assume  the average  matching  rate of the central  government
specific-purpose  disbursements  is one-third,  about half of the prefecture  government  expenditures  are for
subsidized  activities.
Table 2.7. Distribution  of Central Government  Disbursements  for Specific Purpose, 1989 (Yen billion,
percent)
Prefectures  Municipalities  Net total
Subsidies for compulsory  2,564.5 (36.40)  ...  2,564.5 (24.7)
eduction
Livelihood  protection  178.3  (2.5)  868.0(26.0)  1,046.3  (10.1)
Welfare  allowances  for  124.2  (1.8)  239.6 (7.20)  363.9 (3.5)
children
Medical  expenses  for mental  18.4  (0.3)  10.9  (0.3)  29.3 (0.3)
patients
Welfare  allowances for the  43.4 (0.6)  ...  43.4 (0.4)
aged
Ordinary  construction  2,457.3  (34.9)  1,074.2  (32.2)  3,531.5  (34.0)
outlays
Restoration work  291.2 (4.1)  105.9 (3.2)  397.1(3.8)
after disasters
Others  1,277.5  (18.1)  897.4  (26.9)  2,174.9 (21.0)
Total  7,043 (100.0)  3,333.1 (100.0)  10,376.8
(100.0)
Source:  Y'onehara  (1993).
The distribution of specific purpose disbursements  in  1989 by categories established by the
Ministry  of Home Affairs is presented  in Table 2.7.  Nearly 34 percent of the total central government
specific  purpose  disbursements  (of both prefecture  and municipal  governments)  are subsidies  for ordinary
constructions. These subsidies  include  grants for roads, bridges, parks, river banks, harbors and public
housing. As a single  program,  that subsidizing  the salaries  of teachers  engaged  in compulsory  education  is
the largest. In Table 2.6, this disbursement  program  is included  in the subsidy  for compulsory  education
disbursed  to prefectures. For municipalities,  the largest  disbursement  program  is for ordinary  construction.
Almost all special purpose disbursements  are cost-sharing grants.  They subsidize a  certain
percentage  of the standard  cost prescribed  by the central  government.  The rate of subsidy  differs from one
program lo another. For instance, the grant for teachers' salaries in public primary and junior schools
27subsidizes  50 percent of the standard expenditures. The grant for livelihood  protection  subsidizes 75
percent of the standard expenditures. The subsidizing  share is generally  large for those programs that
impose  heavy  fiscal  burdens  on local governments,  or in which  the central government  has strong interests.
Conversely,  the subsidizing  share is  small for programs that are inherently the functions of local
governments.  The  grant rates  of some  typical local  activities  are as follows:
Local Activities  Typical  Grant Rates
Capital  Grants
Local road construction  1/2
Local road improvement  2/3
River  riparian  works  and dams  2/3
Port construction  and improvement  1/2
Local airport  construction  and improvement  3/4
Sewage  pipes  2/3
Sewage  treatment  plants  1/3
Public  housing  1/2
Public  health  office  appliances  1/2
Primary  and secondary  school  building  1/2
High school  buildings  1/3
Recurrent  Grants
National  road maintenance  1/2
River  maintenance  1/3
Primary  and secondary  school  teachers'  salary  1/2
Source:  Fujiwara  (1992).
Generally speaking,  local governments  with strong fiscal capacities spend more on subsidized
programs  than local governments  with low fiscal capacities. Thus, if the actual amount  of expenditure  was
used as a base to calculate  the subsidies,  wealthy  local governments  would be subsidized  more  generously
than poor local governments.  This is one reason why central  government  specific  purpose disbursements
are now  determined  on the basis of standard  costs prescribed  by the central  government. Occasionally,  the
local governments  are known  to criticize  these  standard  costs  as being  too low.
Most of  the central government special purpose disbursements  are  allocated among local
governments  at the discretion  of the central government;  there are only a few formula disbursements.
Therefore,  every  local governments  seeks  to obtain specific  purpose  disbursements  to the maximum  extent
possible. To that end, local governments  spend  time and energy  on rent-seeking.
The  procedure  of allocating  a particular  specific  purpose  program  is as follows:  a local government
submits an application  for a disbursement  to the central  government;  the application  describes  te  project
and explains the reasons for its importance;  and the central government  assesses all of the applications
submitted  by local governments  and selects  projects  that receive  grants. During  this selection  process, the
28central  government  often  requires  modifications  to a project  so that it will  conform  with central  govermnent
standards.  Needless to say, almost all local governments  accept the conditions  required.  Conditions
accompanying  the allocation  of a specific purpose disbursement  provide  the central government  with a
powerful  means  of control  over the activities  of the local governments.
Local Tramsfer  Taxes
In addition  to local allocation  tax and the central  government  specific  purpose disbursements,  the
local governments  also receive  several  relatively  small transfer  taxes from the central  government. These
transfer taxes include  Consumption  Transfer  Tax, Local Road Tax, Petroleum  Gas Transfer Tax, Motor
Vehicle  Tonnage  Tax, and Aviation  Fuel Transfer Tax.  In 1990,  they accounted  for about 2.7 percent of
total local revenues. Consumption  Transfer  Tax is the largest  transfer  tax among  the five and is transferred
to both prefectures and municipalities. -Six eleventh  the total Consumption  Transfer Tax goes to the
prefectures and five eleventh  to the municipalities. Each local body receives  the amount based on its
population  and the number  of workers  employed  in its jurisdiction. This tax is earmarked  for uses specified
by the central government. Local Road Tax, Petroleum  Gas Transfer  Tax, and Motor Vehicle  Tonnage
Tax are all earmarked  for road construction  and maintenance.  Aviation  Transfer  Tax is earmarked  for the
prevention  of nuisance  caused  by flight  noise  and the improvement  of the environment  of airports.
2.8. Korea14
Initergovernmental  fiscal transfer in Korea is administered through five major transfer mechanisms.
They are (1) Local Shared Tax; (2) National Treasury Subsidy; (3) Local Transfer Fund; (4) Adjustment
Allocation Grant; and (5) Provincial Government Subsidy.  The first three transfers are
distributed from the central to provincial governments, while the latter two are transfers from major cities
or provinces to lower level governments.  The Local  Shared Tax and National  Treasury Subsidy are the
traditional  means  utilized  by  the  central  government  to  transfer  certain  fiscal  resources  to  local
governments.  The Local Transfer Fund, introduced in  1991, can also be categorized as a mechanism to
transfer a.  portion of the fiscal base of the central government to local governments except that the transfer
is made directly  out of national  tax revenue  without  having  the revenue  accounted  for first in the central
government  budget. According  to the 1994 budget,  Local Shared Tax accounted  for 12.2 percent  of total
local government  revenue,  National  Treasury  Subsidy  accounted  for 7.5 percent, and Local Transfer  Fund
accounted  for 5.0 percent. The last two mechanisms  are the means  used by the regional governments  to
transfer some of their fiscal resources  to municipal  districts,  municipal  governments,  and the rural county
governments.
Local  Shared Tax. Very similar to Japan's Local Allocation Tax, Local Shared Taxes in Korea is
divided  into Ordinary  Local Shared  Taxes and Special  Local Shared  Taxes. Ordinary  Local Shared  Taxes,
which  comprise  10/11  of the total, are distributed  on the basis of the pre-determined  equalization  formula.
14 The author  would  like  to thank  Dr. Jhungsoo  Park of Korean  Tax Istitute for providing  me with  the most
recent  materials. Parts of this section  draw from Kim (1994).
29Special  Local Shared Taxes,  which comprise  1/1  1 of the total, is allocated  on the basis of special  needs of
local govermments.
The objective of Ordinary Local Shared Taxes is to  equalize the fiscal capacities of  local
governments.  Very similar  to that in Japan,  the equalization  formula  used to distribute  Local Shared  Taxes
in Korea calculates  for each  local government  the standardized  fiscal  needs,  the standardized  fiscal revenue,
and their difference. The difference  between  these  two figures signifies  the standardized  fiscal shortage  of
the local government  and becomes the basis of actual allocation of Ordinary Local Shared Taxes.
Calculation  of the standardized  figures  and their adjustment  for special  local circumstances  are all made on
the basis of pre-determined  formula  for objectivity  and transparency. The results of these calculations  and
actual allocation of Local Shared Tax among local governments  are published annually for public
inspection  and scrutiny.  While Ordinary Local Shared Taxes are unconditional  grants to  the local
governments,  Special Shared Taxes are conditional  grants to supplement  the operation of the Ordinary
Local Shared  Taxes.
The  mathematical  formula  for the allocation  of local shared  tax is as follows:
Fiscal Scarcity  = Standard  fiscal  need (A)  - Standard  fiscal revenue  (B)
where  A = Standard  fiscal need  + Supplemental  need (standard  fiscal  need  = sum of 29 itemized  measuring
unit x unit cost x supplemental  coefficient);  B = local tax revenue  x 0.8.
The total amount  to be transferred  through local shared tax is predetermined  (13.27 percent of the
national  tax revenues),  and may not cover  the total of local fiscal scarcities. Therefore,  a percentage-
distribution  ratio--is  used to multiply  each locality's  fiscal scarcity.  The actual transfer to a locality is
therefore  the product  of the distribution  ratio and its fiscal scarcity. The  distribution  ratio is defined  as:
Distribution  ratio = total transfer  amount(C)  / total fiscal scarcity
National Treasury Subsidy. Like  Japan's Central Government  Disbursements,  Korea's National
Treasury Subsidies  are categorical  grants provided  by the central government  to local governments  for
specific projects.  National Treasury Subsidies  are classified into three categories:  National Treasury
Share, Promotion  Subsidies,  and Specific  Grants.  National Treasury Share is provided  on the matching
basis for natural disaster recovery  projects and other construction  projects.  Promotional  Subsidies  are
allocated to local governments  to encourage  them to undertake certain projects or to provide financial
assistance  for certain  projects. Specific  Grants are provided  usually  for the full cost of administering  some
national  functions such as general election,  military recruitment,  etc..  In the 1994 budget, the National
Treasury  Subsidies  reached  8.1 percent  of local general  account  revenue  and 4.3 of the central  government
general  revenue.
Local Transfer Fund.  Local Transfer Tax was introduced  in 1991  to strengthen  the local fiscal
base and to ensure  balanced  regional  development.  The Local Transfer  Fund Act stipulates  that 50 percent
of excess land tax, 80 percent of liquor tax, and 100 percent of telephone  tax are the sources of Local
Transfer  Fund.  The Act also specifies  the distribution  method  and targeted  projects for which the Local
30Transfer Fund is to be used by local governments.  The fund is transferred  directly  to local governments
out of the clesignated  tax revenue  without  first being  accounted  for in the central  government  budget.
In 1994,  70.5 percent of the Local Transfer  Fund  is to be used for local road maintenance. Other
projects designated  by the Act are regional  development  projects (17 percent), rural development  projects
(11.5 percent),  and youth related  projects  (1 percent). The allocation  formula  for each local government  is
also specified  in the Act.  The fund for local roads are allocated  on the basis of the proportion  of the total
length  of local roads located  within  the  jurisdiction  of a local government.  Other funds  are allocated  on the
basis of the standardized  fiscal shortage  of local governments,  approved  local and national  project plan,
etc.
Fiscal  Adjustment  Grant. Fiscal Adjustment  Grant is a transfer scheme  introduced  in 1988 for
Seoul and five major cities to supplement  and-equalize  the fiscal bases of autonomous  districts in their
cities.  Fixed percentages  of Acquisition  Tax and Registration  Tax are used to finance this grant.  The
percentages  are determined  in each city by the city ordinance.  The allocation of the grant to each
autonomous  district is made  by the formula  modelled  after Local Shared Tax.  The grant supplements  the
general  revenue  of the district.  In 1994,  Fiscal Adjustment  Grant is 17.4 percent  of Seoul City's general
account budget  and 33 percent of its autonomous  districts'  general account budget. For five major cities
together thle  grant forms 19.7 percent of the city budget and comprises  40 percent of the autonomous
districts  budget.
Provincial  Government  Transfer  System. There are two forms of inter-governmental  transfer
system  at the regional  level. One is Provincial  Subsidy,  and the other  is Tax Collection  Grant. Provincial
Subsidy  is basically  specific  grant provided  by the provincial  government  to municipal  governments  and
rural county  governments  for specific  projects. Tax Collection  Grant provides 30 percent the provincial
taxes to the municipal  and rural governments  as their general  revenues. This system  is in effect a form of
tax-sharing  scheme  between  the provincial  governments  and municipal  and rural  governments.
2.9. Indonesia' 5
Indonesia  has probably  one of the most centralized  tax system in the world. The center collects
more  than two  thirds of the total government  revenue,  and transfers  more  than half of the centrally  collected
revenues  to subnational  governments  through  grants. Currently  central  government  grants finance  about 65
percent  of expenditure  at the provincial  level  and 70 percent  of expenditure  at the district level. Currently
there are two types of transfers--general  purpose  transfers and specific  purpose transfers-from the center
to provinces  and districts.
General purpose transfers.  In  1992/93, general purpose grants constituted 8.9 percent of
provincial  and 9.2 percent of local government  revenues. These general purpose  transfers are more like
5 This  section  is based  on Zia (1993)  and Shah  et al (1994).
31block grants in the U.S., which are subject  to the some broad guidelines  set by the central  government.
Four  types of general  purpose  transfers  are:
(1) Provincial  Development  Grant. This is a formula-based  grant scheme,  85 percent  of the funds
are distributed  by giving  equal share to each province  (In 1992/93,  Rp. 22.5 billion each). The remaining
funds are allocated  in proportion  to the total area of each  province. Although  the center has recently  given
the provinces  more  flexibility  in the use of these funds, it still recommends  that road maintenance  should
receive  high priority.
(2)  District Development  Grant.  This  is  again a  formula-based grant scheme with two
components:  a minimum  grant for each local government  (Rp. 750 million  in 1992.93);  and a per capita
grant (Rp. 4,000 in 1992/93).  In 1992/93,  the first component  accounted  for 11 percent and the second
accounted  for 89 percent of in total grant allocation. Projects  are subject  to approval by the provincial
governor  following  evaluation  by the Provincial  Planning  Board and Public  Works Service  Bureau. Funds
are not transferred  to local governments  but are simply  deposited  with the local branches  of Bank Rakyat
Indonesia  which  pays approved  contractors'  bills. This is done to prevent  diversion  of grant funds  to non-
approved  projects. Most of the funds  from this grant program  have been spent on local road renovations
and improvements.
(3) Village Development  Grant.  This is an equal per village  grant.  In 1992/93, each village
received  Rp. 4.5 million. Development  projects for financing  by this program have to be approved  by
mayor/district  chief.
(4) Less-Developed  Village Grant. This is a per capita grant program initiated in  1994/95.
According  to a recent  survey,  20,633 out of a total of 65,554  villages  nationwide  would  be eligible  for this
grant. It is proposed  that the village  governments  have full discretion  in the use of the funds  provided  the
follow  the guidelines  developed  by the Planning  Board in consultation  with the Ministry of Home  Affairs,
the Ministry  of Finance,  and provincial  governments.  Some  of the potential  uses are: small scale  credit for
self-help  housing  and/or  environmental  improvements;  technical  materials  and manuals  to support self-help
efforts to improve  agriculture  technology  and/or  introduce  new agricultural  activities,  or to support small
urban enterprise start-up; purchase of supplementary  "strategic"  medicines  for preventive  care or the
treatment of endemic  illnesses  and epidemics;  and installation  of small-scale  health-related  infrastructure,
such  as drainage  or waste water  disposal  facilities.
The Planning  Board, Ministry  of Home Affairs and Ministry of Finance  will oversee  this grant
program, and funds will be disbursed  by the Ministry  of Finance,  directly  to the local level. The Kepala
Desa/lurah will be the official at the local level responsible  for immediate  accounting  for the use of the
funds, subject to monitoring  by the Bagian Keuangan,  Dati II and overall scrutiny by the BPKP, the
Government  audit agency.
Specific purpose transfers.  Specific purpose transfers account for about 80 percent of total
central  government  transfers in 1992/3. The central  government  makes specific  purpose  transfers  to both
provincial  and  local  government to  finance  primary  education,  health,  transportation, and
32reforestation/conservation.  The four programs  designed  to assist  the provincial  governments  are outlined  in
the following  paragraph. Similar  programs  exist  to assist  the local  governments.
(1.) Subsidy  for Autonomous  Regions (SDO).  This transfer program aims to create "financial
balance" in autonomous  regions. It finances staff expenditures  of provincial  and local governments  to
enable them to balance their budgets.  In 1992/93, 88 percent of this grant are used to cover salaries,
pensions  and allowances  of subnational  officials  of all ranks; 4 percent to use of routine expenditures  of
subnational government  on centrally delegated  functions; 3 percent on the operating costs of primary
schools; 5 percent on items such as staff allowance  to be paid to subdistrict  level administration  and for
staff training and compensation.
(2) Provincial  Road Improvement  Grant. This grant is to develop  and maintain  provincial  roads.
Eligible  expenditures  include  construction  and maintenance  of roads and bridges. The grant is based on a
formula  which  takes into  consideration  the length  ad condition  of the roads and the unit cost of construction
and maintenance.
(3) Reforestation/Conservation  grant.  This program is intended  to carry out reforestation,  soil
conservatuion  and re-greening  activities in environmentally  critical areas.  Grant allocation is made on a
project-by-project  basis.
(4) Counterpart Funds.  These programs provide matching  funds from the central government
budget  to meet  matching  funds  requirements  for externally  funded  projects  on behalf of provincial  and local
governments.
PART III. LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES
This part attempts  to draw a number  of practical lessons  for countries  that intend  to introduce  a
formula-based  equalizationm  transfer system. Based on a comparison  of the nine  countries'  cases, Section
3.1 classifies the equalization  transfer schemes adopted by different countries into several types and
comments'  on the data requirement  for each of these types.  Section  3.2 discusses  the methods  to assess
fiscal capacities  and fiscal  needs  of subnational  governments. Section  3.3 answers  the question  of whether
fiscal equalization  affects tax effort of subnational  governments.  Section 3.4 discusses  possible data
sources for the application of an equalization  transfer formula.  Section 3.5 turns to  address the
institutional  requirements  for developing  a new transfer system.  Section 3.6 discusses  the transitional
arrangements  from an old, discretionary  system  to a new, formula-based  system. The last section  offers  the
concluding  remarks.
3.1. Formulas for Equalization  Transfers
Roughly  speaking,  there are four types of formula  for equalization  transfers:
33Formula A.  Formulas  that consider  not only the equalization  of fiscal capacities,  but also adjust
for the expenditure  needs of different  regions. Applications  of these formulas  can be found in Australia,
Germany, Japan, Korea, and the United Kingdom.  Such formulas are demanding  in terms of data
requirement,  particularly  those on expenditure  needs.
A typical  formula  of this type  is as follows:
TR =  Nj-  Cj-OTR  (1)
where  N, is the fiscal  need of the ith region,  and C, is the fiscal capacity  of the ith region. Nj  - Cj  measures
the gap between  the fiscal need and fiscal capacity (own sources of revenue). OTRj represents other
transfers (e.g., specific  purpose  transfers)  the ith region  receives  from the center. This formula states that
the central government  transfer will fill the gap between  each region's  fiscal need and fiscal capacity, to
ensure  that a region  with reasonable  tax effort  will be able  to provide  a reasonable  level  of public  services.
There is a question  of how  to match  the sum of the entitlements  (I,TlRj)  calculated  from the above
formulas  with the available  pool for transfers. In theory,  the pool can either be larger or smaller  than the
total entitlement.  A commonly  used method  is to adjust  the size of the transfer  proportionally  according  to
the size  of the pool. Let TT be the size  of pool for transfers. Then  the actual  transfer  to the ith region  is:
ATRi = (T  T/EITRj)TRj
where  ATRj  stands for actual  transfer  to the ith region,  and TRi  is calculated  using  equation  (1).
Another way to match entitlements  with funds available  is to use a coefficient,  a,  in front of the
fiscal gap, (Ni - Q:
TRE  =  a(Ni  -C  -OTRj  (2)
where  a  is chosen  in such a way that TT=ETR,. A variation  of this method  is to apply this coefficient  to
Nj,  instead  of (Nj-Cj),  that is,
TRj  =  aNj- Ci- OTRj  (3)
where  a is chosen  in such a way that TT=T  iTRj.
A third way to match entitlements  with funds available is to include  a "standard  transfer" in the
formula:
T  R =  STi  +  Nj-  Cj-  OTRj  (4)
34where STj is the standard  transfer  to the ith region. It is calculated  by multiplying  a standard  amount  of per
capita transfer  with the population  in region  i.  The standard  per capita  transfer can be positive  or negative,
and its magnitude  is determined  in such a way that TT=EiTRi.
Formula B. A formula  that considers  only  the equalization  of fiscal capacities. An example  is the
formula  used in Canada. This type of formula has a relatively  weak requirement  for data and is easy to
implemernt.  But it ignores  the potentially  large  differences  in special  expenditure  needs  across  regions.
A typical  formula  of this type (often  called  representative  tax system)  is as follows:
lTR,  = Pi (B/P - Bi/P)t  (5)
where  T11 1 is the transfer  from the center  to the ith region,  Pi is the population  of the ith region,  Bi is the tax
base of the ith region,  P is the total population  of the country,  B is the total tax base of the country,  and t is
the country's  average  effective  tax rate on the tax base.  B/P - Bi/Pi  measures  the gap between  the national
average  per capita tax base and the ith region's  per capita tax base.  This formula  states that the central
government  transfer  will bring  the fiscal  capacity  of the below-average  region  up to the national  average.
In Canada, regions with below-average  capacities (TRO>0)  receive transfers from the central
government,  and regions  with above-average  capacities  (TR,>O)  receive  no transfer  but are not required  to
contribute  to the pool for transfers. In Germany,  however,  the interstate  equalization  transfers are made
directly  across states--states  with above-average  capacities  contribute  funds  to a pool that is distributed  to
below-average  states.
A variation  of this formula  uses a different  "average"  per capita  tax base as the bench-mark  level
for comparison. Namely,  the national  average B/P is replaced  by the average of a group of regions. The
selection  of this group can be used as an instrument  by the central  government  to adjust  the intensity  of the
equalization  effort. If the central government  selects  a group that yields  a group average lower than the
national  average,  the transfer scheme  becomes  less than "funl"  equalization  and requires  a smaller pool of
fiscal resources.
An equalization  transfer  scheme  based on this type of formula  assumes  that per capita fiscal needs
of all the regions are the same. This is an over-simplification  and may create a new source of regional
disparity  if the costs of providing  public services  differ  vastly across regions. However,  if a country  has
relatively  insignificant  regional  cost differentials  or data on such cost differentials  are not available,  this
formula  imay  be a convenient  option  to consider.
]Formula  C. Formulas that distribute equalization  transfers based on some "needs"  indicators.
Fiscal capacity  is not considered  in these formulas  often  because such data are difficult  to obtain. India,
Italy, and Spain use this type of formula. There are varieties  of indicators  that can reflect  the fiscal needs
of regions, and the choices are very much dependent  on the government's  objectives  as well as other
historical and political factors.  Typical indicators (often used in combination  with weights) used to
determine  regions'  fiscal  needs include:







School  enrollment  rate;
Infrastructure  (e.g., length  of roads and railways);
Other indicators of  development  level (e.g, electricity consumption and  number of
telephone  lines).
What indicators  should  be chosen  and how much  weight  each indicator  should  be given  are highly
sensitive  questions and need to be answered with careful simulations  and consultations  with regional
authorities.
Formula  D.  Formulas  that distribute  equalization  transfers on an equal per capita basis.  Such
formulas are used in Germany's  VAT sharing, Canada's EPF, England's NDR, and in a  number of
Indonesia's  general purpose grants.  Compared  to the above three types of transfers, equal per capita
transfer is least demanding  for data, but has relatively  weak equalization  effects.
The simplest  equal  per capita  transfer  formula  is as follows:
TR, = Pi (TT/P)  (6)
where TT is total amount  of transfer  and P is total population  eligible  for the transfer  program.
Equal per capita transfer cannot fully equalize but can mitigate regional disparity in  fiscal
capacity. To see this, suppose  there are only two regions, region A and region B, with per capita tax
revenues  of $1000 and $2000 respectively. An equal per capita transfer of $1000 reduces  the ratio of
region  B's per capita tax revenue  to that of region  A from 2 to 3/2.  But unless the per capita transfer is
infinity,  the ratio is always less than one (full equalization).
Comments:  Type A formula provides  the potential for full equalization. It is the most complex
and perhaps most accurate  one in measuring  horizontal  fiscal gaps, but is also most demanding  for data.
Types B and C each ignore  a major aspect (capacity  or need)  of the horizontal  equalization,  and thus are
less effective  in addressing  regional  disparity  issues. However,  they require  less data and may  be appealing
for countries  that intend  to start an equalization  transfer system on an experimental  basis.  Type D is
probably  least effective  in terms of equalization,  but is also least  demanding  for data.
3.2. Measuring  Fiscal  Capacities  and Fiscal  Needs
The above subsection  mentioned  several  times the fiscal capacity (Ci) and fiscal need (Ni) of a
subnational  government.  This subsection  discuss  the details  on how  to estimate  these  variables.
36Measuring  fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity is defined  as the ability of a govermnent  to raise
revenues  from its own sources. There are several  ways to measure  the fiscal capacity of a subnational
government. In many  developed  countries,  fiscal capacity  is measured  using figures  of major  tax bases and
standard 'average)  tax rates.  This method measures  the fiscal capacity  of a region by the revenue  that
could  be r  aised in that region  if the regional  government  taxes all the standard  tax bases with the standard
tax effort. The formula  is as follows:
Ci = Z:jBij*tj  (7)
where Ci is the ith region's  tax capacity, Bij  is the ith region's  jth tax base, and tj,  is the standard (e.g.,
national  average  effective)  tax rate on the  jth tax base. It is important  to apply  the standard  tax rate to the
region's  tax base rather  than  the region's  own effective  tax rate, in order to ensure  that the regions  with high
tax efforts are not penalized  and regions with low tax efforts are not encouraged. In other words, if the
region's  effective  tax rates are higher  than the national  averages,  the transfer it receives  does not decrease
as a resu]lt;  if the region's  effective  tax rates are lower than the national  averages,  the transfer it receives
does  not increase  as a result.
Applying  this method  involves  several  steps:
Step 1: Select  the tax bases. In practice,  information  on some  tax bases (e.g., numerous  small  tax
bases) may  not be available  or is costly  to obtain. Therefore,  instead  of exhausting  all the tax bases, fiscal
capacity is often measured  using several major tax bases as a proxy.  Personal income tax, corporate
income  tax, sales tax or VAT,  property  tax, and resource  tax are the ones that are often  used in assessing
local fiscal  capacities.
Step 2: Collect  data on the selected  tax bases.  One can use the previous year's figures on tax
bases. There are also cases where  tax bases (e.g., property  tax) are assessed  every few years (say, three
years) since  an annual assessment  may be too costly. Some  of these data may be readily available  from
various departments  of the central  or subnational  governments.  If the data are provided  by the subnational
governments,  it is important  to have  well established  rules on the reporting  and auditing  procedures  as well
as penalties  on false reporting.
Step 3: Select  the standard  tax rates. There are many  different  ways to calculate  the standard  tax
rate on a particular  tax base.  Several  examples  are: (1) the effective  tax rate of the whole  country;  (2) the
arithmetic  mean of all regions'  effective  tax rates; (3) the arithmetic  mean of selected  regions'  effective  tax
rates.
Step 4: Calculate  the fiscal capacities  using  equation  (7).
The method  described  above  requires  detailed  and accurate  information  on major tax bases, which
may not be available  in many countries. In such a case, fiscal capacity may be measured  indirectly  by
employing  some income  or output indicators. The most frequently  used indicators  are:
37(a) Gross Domestic  Product (GDP) of the region. The region's  fiscal capacity is measured  by the
product of its GDP and a standard revenue/GDP  ratio, where this standard ratio can be the national
average or an average of a group of regions. The main weakness  of using the GDP indicator  is that it
ignores the fact that different structures of the regional economies  may have important impact on the
regions'  abilities  to generate  revenues.  For example,  with the same  level  of per capita GDP, a region  with a
high percentage  of agricultural  production  may have a lower revenue  capacity  than a region  with a high
percentage of high value-added  manufacturing  sectors.  To mitigate this effect, one can conduct an
estimation  to determine  to what extend other factors (such as the structure of the economy,  degree of
urbanization,  etc.) affect  the regions'  fiscal capacities,  and develop  an adjusted  model  for fiscal capacity  by
incorporating  a few more  variables  in addition  to GDP.
(b) Personal income  (sum of all incomes  received  by the residents)  or disposable  personal  income
of the region. The region's  fiscal capacity is measured  by the product of its total personal  income  and a
standard  revenue/personal  income  ratio.  This is an imperfect  measure of fiscal capacity since personal
income  is only  one revenue  source  and may  not be proportional  to the sum of all tax bases.
(c) Total retail sales of the region. If consumption  based taxes are important  revenue  sources  of
the region, it may be a good proxy of its total tax base.  The region's  fiscal capacity is measured  by the
product  of its total retail  sales and a standard  revenue  to total retail  sales ratio.
It is important  not to use the regions'  actual revenue  figures to measure  their fiscal capacities. If
the actual figures are used, the transfer a region receives from the center becomes largely a variable
controlled  by its own tax effort.  The regions would thus have the incentive  to under-collect  their own
revenues  in order to attract more transfers from the center.  The reason is straightforward:  the more a
region collects  from its own sources, the high the measured  fiscal capacity, and the less transfer it will
receive.  In some countries, this system has encouraged subnational governments  to  shift budgetary
revenues  to incomes  outside  of the budgetary  system.
Measuring  fiscal  need. Broadly  speaking,  there are two methods  used to determine  fiscal needs of
subnational  governments. The first method,  used by the United Kingdom,  Australia, Japan, and Korea,
divides  the expenditures  of a subnational  government  into many different  categories  and for each category
estimates  the need of this government.  The total fiscal need  of a subnational  government  is the sum of the
estimated  needs  for all these  categories. This approach  involves  the following  steps:







Police  and fire
38Environmental  protection
Other Services
Of course,  depending  on the country's  existing  budgeting  rules and data availability,  the division  of
expenditure categories  can  have  many  variations.  One  can  combine  transportation with
telecommunications,  separate  police  from fire, divide  social  welfare  further  into  many smaller  items,  divide
education  into  primnary,  secondary,  and post-secondary  educations,  etc.
Most countries'  equalization  transfer  formulas  take into account  the needs  for current  expenditures
(include maintenance  of capital projects) but exclude those for new capital projects. The reasons are
threefold: (1)  capital projects are typically lumpy in  size, and  their expenditure  needs may vary
significanitly  from year to year; (2) it is difficult  to find appropriate  indicators  that reflect  the needs for new
capital  projects;  and (3) most capital  projects  benefit  users for many  years and even  generations. Requiring
current  tax payers to fully  finance  projects  (as in the case of fiscal  transfer)  that mainly  benefit  future users
is inconsistent  with the "benefits  principle"  of taxation.  In some countries  (e.g., in Japan), however,  local
debt burden is considered  part of the local expenditure  needs. Since  the limit  on local borrowing  imposed
by Japan's Ministry  of Home Affairs  is proportional  to local own revenue,  its transfer formula  effectively
assumes  that a locality's  expenditure  need  for new capital  projects  is proportional  to its fiscal  capacity.
Step 2. Calculate  the expenditure  need for each category  and then sum up these needs to get the
region's  aggregate  fiscal  need. An illustrative  example  is discussed  below.
The general  formula  for calculating  expenditure  need  in category  i can be written  as:
Ni = Measurement Unit * Average Per Unit Cost * Adjustment Index
where i  standards for the ith expenditure  category, such as  education,  health, transportation, etc.
Measurement  unit refers to the number of units that receive services  from the regional government.
Average  per unit cost is defined  as total local expenditure  on category  i divided  by the measurement  unit
(e.g., the average per unit cost of primary and secondary  eduction  is the ratio of the total expenditure  on
primary  and secondary  eduction  to the total number  of students  in the country). One can use the previous
year's  data in this calculation. Adjustment  index  is a combination  of factors  that differentiate  the per unit
cost of the service  in the region  from  the national  average.
(1) Primary  and Secondary  Education
Measurement  unit = population  of school  ages (e.g, age 7-18)
Average  per unit cost = the country's per capita public expenditure  on primary and
secondary  education
Adjustment index = a1WI + a2RCI + a3SDI + a4PFI
where  WI (wage  index)  = the ratio of teachers'  wage level in this region  to the  national  average;
39RCI (rental  cost index)  = the ratio of per square rental  cost in this region  to the national  average;
SDI (student disability index) = the ratio of the percentage of students with physical
disabilities  in this region  to the national  average;
PFI (poor  family index)  = the ratio of the percentage  of students  from low-income  families
in this region  to the national  average.
The weights  attached  to the four factors should  add up to one, i.e., a, + a2 + a3 + a4 = 1.  These
weights  can be derived  from an econometric  estimation  using cross-region  or penal data (cross  region and
time series)  from  the past years. Shah (1994a)  provides  an example  of such an estimation.  Many countries
try arbitrary values  of weights  based on the designers'  intuition  about the importance  of different  factors in
affecting  the costs of services.  Assigning these weights can also be a  method for the designers to
emphasize  certain  factors in grant distribution.
Figures  used to calculate  the indices  (WI, RCI, SDI, and PFI) are those of the previous  year or
past few  years'  averages.
(2) Health
Measurement  unit = total population  in this region
Average  per unit cost = the country's  per capita  public  expenditure  on health  care
Adjustment  index = a1HPI + a2IMI + a3ILEI + a4IPDI
where  HPI (health  price index)  = the ratio of health  care cost in this region  to the national  average;
IMI  (ifant  mortality  index)  = the ratio of infant  mortality  rate in this region  to the national
average;
ILEI (inverse  life expectancy  index)  = the ratio of national  average life expectancy  to life
expectancy  in this region;
IPDI (inverse  population  density  index)  = the ratio of national  average  population  density
to that in this region;
a,  +a 2 +a 3 +a 4 =  1.
(3) Transportation
Measurement  unit = total length  of roads in this region
Average  per unit cost = the country's  per capita  public  expenditure  on transportation
Adjustment index = a,WI + a2GRI + a3SNI + a4IPDI
where  WI (wage  index)  = the ratio of wage level  in this region  to the national  average;
GRI (grade  index)  = the ratio of average  road grade in this region  to the national  average;
SNI (snow  index)  = the ratio of annual  snowfall  in this region  to the national  average;
40IPDI (inverse  population  density  index)  = the ratio of national  average population  density
to that in this region;
a, +a 2 +a 3 +a 4 =  1.
(4) Police  and Fire
Measurement  unit  total population  in this region
Average  per unit cost = the country's  per capita  public  expenditure  on police  and fire  protection
Adjustment index = a1WI + a2CRI + a3FI + a4UBI
where  WI (wage  index)  = the ratio of wage level  in this region  to the national  average;
CRI (crime  index)  = the ratio of per capita  crime  rate in this region  to the national  average;
FI (fire  index)  = the ratio of per capita  number  of fires in this region  to the national  average;
UBI (urbanization  index)  = the ratio of proportion  of population  in urban areas in this
region  to the national  average;
a, + a2 + a3 + a4=  1.
(5) Social  Welfare
Measurement  unit = total population  in this region
Average  per unit cost = the country's  per capita  public  expenditure  on social  welfare
Adjustment index = aiMWI + a2PVI + a3OAI  + a4UEI + a5DI
where  WI (minimum  wage index)  = the ratio of minimum  wage level  in this region  to the
national  average;
PVI (poverty  index)  = the ratio of percentage  of low-income  population  in this region  to
the national  average;
OAI (old age index)  = the ratio of percentage  of old population  (e.g., age 60 or above)  in
this region  to the national  average;
UEI (unemployment  index)  = the ratio of unemployment  rate in this region  to the national
average;
DI (disability  index)  = the ratio of percentage  of physically  disabled  people  in this region
to the national  average;
a, + a2 + a3 + a4 + a5 =1
(6) Other Services
Measurement  unit = total population  in this region
Average  per unit cost = the country's  per capita  public  expenditure  on other  services
41Adjustment index = a,WI + a2RCI + a3UBI
where  WI (wage  index)  = the ratio of wage  level  in this region  to the national  average;
RCI (rental cost index)  = the ratio of per square  rental cost in this region  to the national  average;
UBI (urbanization  index)  = the ratio of proportion  of population in urban areas in this
region  to the national  average;
a, + a2+ a3 = 1.
The above method  to calculate  regions' fiscal needs require substantial information  on a large
number  of factors that affect  the costs of providing  public  services. Much of these  information  may not be
available  in some countries. This being  the case, a feasible solution  is to use fewer variables to estimate
directly  a region's  aggregate  fiscal  need. There  can be many  different  forms  of this type of formula. Below
we discuss  a few examples:
(1) Estimate  a region's  fiscal  need  on the basis on population,  income  level,  and area:
N 1 = TE[wp(P/I,jPj)  + wI(IDPi/IJIDiPj)  + wA(A,/YAi)  ]
where  N 1 is the fiscal  need  of the ith region;
TE is the total expenditure  made  by regions;
Pi is the population  in the ith region;
wp is the weight assigned to population;
ID;  is the per capita income  distance  from  the richest  region;
w, is the weight  assigned  to income  disparity;
Ai is the area of ith region;
wA  is the weight assigned to area;
Wp+W  +WA=  1
Area is included  in the formnula  because  it accounts  for differences  in the cost of providing  many
public services. Services  such as roads, telecommunications,  schools,  and libraries face higher  per capita
production costs in sparsely populated regions than those in densely  populated regions.  The income
distance  factor in the formula reflects  the govenmment's  explicit  objective  to address regional  disparity.' 6
Other  variables  that can be considered  for this formula  include  population  density,  tax effort  (revenue/GDP
ratio), etc.
(2) Estimate  a region's  fiscal  need  using  only education  and health indicators: 17
The  distribution  based  on income  distances  are  scaled  by population,  because  otherwise  a region  with  a large
population  and a region  with a small  population  would  get the same  amount  of entidement  as long as their  per
capita  incomes  are  the  same. The  same  logic  applies  to the  treatment  of weather  condition.
A variation  of this formula  is prsented in Gupta  et  al (1996).
42Ni = SIi*fIi*Pi*c
where  N 1 is the fiscal  need  of the ith region;
SI; is the student  index;
HI; is the health  index;
pi is the  population  of the ith region;
c is the per capita  public  expenditure  of the country;
SIi  =  (S/P)/(Si/P,);
1Hi  =  (FP)/(H,/P,);
and where Si is the number  of students  in the ith region,  Hi is the number  of health care workers  in the ith
region,  P is the total population  of the country,  S is the total number  of students in the country,  H is the
total number  of health care workers  in the country. SIi roughly measures  the enrollment  rate of the ith
region  relative  to the national  average. HI, measures  the number  of health care workers  per capita in this
region  relative  to the national  average.
(:3)  Estimate  a region's  fiscal  need  using  indicators  that reflect  "wealth": 18
Ni = EI,*TIi*Pi*c
where  Ni  is the fiscal  need  of the ith  region;
ElI,  is the electricity  index;
Tli is the telecommunications  index;
P;,  is the population  of the ith region;
c is the per capita  public  expenditure  of the country;
EIi  = (E/P)/(E,IPi);
'li  = (T/P)I(E,/Pi);
and where  Ei is the level  of electricity  consumption  in the ith region,  Ti is the number  of telephone  lines in
the ith regiont  P is the total population  of the country,  E is the total electricity  consumption  in the country,
T is the total number  of telephone  lines in the country. EI, and TI, measure  the levels  of consumption  of
electricity  and telecommunications  relative  to the national  averages.
3.3. Does  Fiscal  Equalization  Reduce  Local  Tax Effort?
A,  frequently  heard  criticism  of equalization  transfer schemes  is that equalization  may adversely
affect localities'  effort  to collect  revenue.  The  rationale  is that because  an equalization  scheme  redistributes
revenue  fiom revenue  rich  regions  to revenue  poor regions,  the former  may  purposely  reduce  their tax effort
1S  Ibid.
43in order not to be penalized  by the transfer scheme.  This reasoning  is, in most cases, a false impression  of
fiscal  equalization.
Consider  the formula  described  by equations  (1) and (7). In this formula,  local fiscal capacities  are
calculated  using the previous year's tax bases and standard tax rates set by the central government.
Therefore,  fiscal capacities  are independent  from tax effort (the actual tax rates). If a locality  increases its
tax effort  by raising  its tax rates above  the standard  rates,  the transfer  that it will receive  does not decrease.
If the locality  reduces  its tax rates to levels  below  standards,  it will not receive  more  transfer as a result. In
other  words,  such a formula  does  not encourage  low  tax effort,  and does not discourage  high tax effort. The
additional  revenue  collected  due to a locality's  higher  effort  will be kept by itself. In this sense,  this formula
encourages  local tax effort.
Of course,  if a locality's tax base increases,  its transfer will  decrease. However,  it is important  to
note that, if the formula is appropriately  designed,  the magnitude  of the decline  in transfer can be rather
small  relative  to the benefits  a locality  can gain from the increase  in tax base. As a result, localities  do not
have the incentive  to reduce  tax bases simply  for the purpose  of attracting  more  transfers.  This point can be
illustrated  by the following  example.
Consider  a country  with only two regions,  A and B, each having a population  of 1 million  and one
local tax base-income.  Region  A has a high per capita income  of $1000, and region B has a low per
capita income  of $500. Suppose  that the per capita  expenditure  needs  are the same in the two regions, and
local tax rates in both regions are 10 percent. In per capita  terms, an equalization  formula  will redistribute
$25 from Region  A to Region B.  This reduces  the net per capita income in Region A to $975, and
increases  the net per capita income  in Region  B to $525. Obviously  Region  A does not have the incentive
to reduce  its tax base to Region  B's level:  this will avoid the -$25 transfer, but it will reduce its net per
capita income  from  $975 to $500.19  Moreover,  Region  A does not even  have the incentive  to reduce its tax
base by a small margin. A comparison  of the following  two hypothetical  cases shows that if Region A
reduces  its tax base from $1000 to $900, its transfer will fall from -$25 to -$20, but its net per capita
income  will  fall from $975 to $880.
Case 1: Region  A's Per Capita Tax Base is $1000
Region  A  Region  B
($)  ($)
Per capita  income  1000  500
Per capita  local tax revenue  100  50
Per capita  transfer  -25  25
19  When  the  two  regions'  tax bases  are  both $500,  no transfer  will  take  place.
44Per capita revenue  after transfer  75  75
Per capita  net income  975  525
(income  + transfer)
Case 2: Region  A Reduces  Its Per Capita  Tax Base to $900
Region  A  Region  B
($)  ($)
Per capita income  900  500
Per capila local  tax revenue  90  50
Per capila  transfer  -20  20
Per capita revenue  after transfer  70  70
Per capita  net income  880  520
(income + transfer)
3.4. Sources of Data  Required  for Calculation
][n  selecting  formulas  for equalization  transfer,  a major consideration  is the availability  of data.  In
many  developing  countries,  data constraints  force  the central  government  to adopt  relatively  simple  models
with fewr  variables.  This section  briefly discusses  the possible channels through which data could be
collected  for the purpose  of calculating  equalization  transfers.
'The  central  government  agency  in charge equalization  transfer can use a variety of data sources.
In most countries,  the easiest  source  is the statistics  provided  by the central  government's  statistical  agency.
In addition  to the central statistical  agency,  line ministries  can often provide  more detailed  statistics on
need indicators  such as demographic  composition,  land areas, student enrolment  rates, health indicators,
length  and quality  of roads,  electricity  consumption,  number  of policemen,  etc.  Data  on local tax bases are
often  supplied  by local tax authorities.20  In cases where  the central  and local governments  share the same
tax bases and the center is responsible  for tax collection,  tax base data can be easily obtained from the
central  tax authorities. In cases where local tax bases differ from central tax bases, local tax authorities
should be required to provide annual tax base figures to the central government  agency in charge of
20 Hen:  "local  governments"  refers  to subnational  governments  in general.
45transfer. It is necessary  to enact a law or issue a central government  ordinance  on fiscal transfer that
obliges  local authorities  to submit  accurate data on a timely  manner. Naturally, incentives  exist for local
governments  to under-report  their tax bases in order to receive  more  transfers. To prevent  such practices,  it
is necessary  to include  penalty clauses on fraud in the law or ordinance. Equally important  is that the
central  government  audits  the statistical  reports submitted  by local governments  (either  by directly  sending
officials  to local  governments  or hiring  independent  auditors).
A general principle  for the application  of formulas  is that the most recent data should  be used to
calculate fiscal transfers.  In other words, the previous year's data on tax bases and expenditure  needs
should be used, whenever  available.  In calculating  fiscal capacities, a  possible approach is to use
forecasted  tax bases to calculate  the preliminary  amounts  of transfer, and base the current year's (e.g.,
1996) initial  disbursements  on these forecasts.  When  the actual  tax base figures  of 1996  become  available
in 1997,  the final amounts  of 1996  transfer are recalculated  with the actual figures.  If the 1996 initial
disbursement  to a locality  is lower/higher  than the final amount, then the difference  is added/subtracted
to/from  the 1997  disbursement.
3.5. Institutional Requirement  for Introducing a Formula-Based  Transfer System
For a country  that has no experience  with a formula-based  transfer system and is interested  in
adopting  one, the first step is to set up a team to work out the methodology  and to conduct  the detailed
calculations. The staff needed  for such a tearn  will include:  (1) officials  from the Ministry  of Finance  who
understand  the basic concerns  of the Ministry on the overall budgetary  impact  of transfers; (2) technical
experts who understand  the models  used by other countries  and the applicability  of these models  to the
country in question,  and who have the ability  to revise/design  their own models  that will be appropriate
under local conditions;  (3) statisticians  who are familiar with the data availability  and who are able to
conduct simulations  with alternative  models. The whole  team should be able to interpret  the simulation
results to the Finance Minister and the concerned  provincial  leaders in an accurate yet non-technical
manner.
In terms  of administrative  affiliation  of the team, a possible  arrangement  is that the team be part of
the Ministry  of Finance  at least in the initial stage of designing  the transfer system. In the long run, the
desirability  of creating  an independent  grants commission  (such  as those in Australia,  India, and Pakistan)
can be considered. The main advantages of an independent  grants commission  include: (1) reduced
political  influence  from both the central  and the regional  governments  and, as a result, (2) the possibility  of
exercising  fair judgements  over disputes  among different  subnational  governments  and between  levels of
governments;  and (3) that the recommendations  made by the independent  commission  are easier to be
accepted  by the parties  involved. The disadvantage  of an independent  grants commission  mainly  has to do
with its limited  authority  in obtaining  data and other supports  from  the subnational  governments.
21 See Searle  (1994)  for  a detailed  discussion  on Australia's  Grants  Commission.
46During the design stage, the team should conduct hearings preferably  in all states/provinces  to
collect information about fiscal capacities, extraordinary  expenditure  needs, and  possible impact of
alternativ(e  arrangements. Once  the system  starts operating,  the grants commission  or another  agency  that
runs the transfer system should publish its  calculation method and results annually, so that  each
state/province  can prepare  its budget  according  to the expected  amount  of transfers.
3.6. Transitional Arrangements
Fiscal expenditures  are the materials that politics is made of.  This point is especially  apparent
when  the,  vested interests  of particular  groups (e.g., regions)  are threatened  by a proposed  reform of the
distribut]ion  formula  of transfers. It is difficult  to imagine  that a major change  in the distribution  method
causes no opposition  from the subnational  governments  that are worse  off because of such changes. Of
course, countries with  different political structures may encounter different levels of  difficulty in
implementing  changes  in the transfer system. Countries  where subnational  governments  have substantial
political  bargaining  powers  must be very careful in assessing  the impact  of the reform  proposal  on and the
possible  reactions  from  the subnational  governments.
One way to maximize  the  political  support  from the subnational  governments  is to phase in the new
system in an incremental  way.  Using  this method,  the number of worse-off  regions  can be reduced  to a
minimum  and even  to zero from  the beginning  of the reform. With fewer  regions  suffering  from the reform,
its political  feasibility  is increased. Two examples  of the such  arrangements  are as follows:
(1) Increase  the weight  of the new system (and to reduce  the weight  of the old system ) in grant
allocation  over an extended  period  of time (say, three  to five  years). That is, over  time, an increasing  share
of the toltal  transfers are distributed  using  the new formula,  and a decreasing  share of the total transfers  are
distributed  using the old method. This method  ensures  that, in each of the first few years of the reform,
there is nio  or very few  net losers  because  the distribution  of grants changes  marginally  every  year.
i(2) For an extended period of time, keep the old system running and the size of the grants
distributed  by the old method  constant  in nominal  terms. As the economy  grows, additional  central  fiscal
resources  made available  for transfers  will be distributed  using the new formula. The old system  will be
abolishol  when its impact  on overall  grant allocation  is no longer  significant. This method  has the same
effect  the first one does.
3.7. Concluding  Remarks
A formula-based equalization  transfer system as  discussed in  this paper has at  least three
advantages  over the discretionary  system  currently  prevailing  in many  countries. (1) It bases  the evaluation
of each r  egion's  entitlement  largely  on objective  variables,  thus avoiding  excessive  bargaining  and lobbying
by the subnational  governments. As a result, it increases  the fairness of the distribution  outcome. (2) A
formula-based  system, if properly  designed,  can eliminate  the disincentive  inherent  in many discretionary
systems that encourage  low tax efforts and over-spending  of the subnational  governments. (3) Most
47important,  a formula-based  equalization  system  provides an effective  means  to address regional disparity
issues. Nevertheless,  the design and implementation  of a new transfer system is never an easy task.  A
careful study of the relevant international  experience  and a  careful assessment of the country's own
situation  are required  if the new system  is to be both economically  rational  and politically  feasible.
48Table 3.'.  Comparison  of  .he Grant  System.s n Nne  Coasr.trie
US  Canada  UK  Germany  Australia  India  Japan  Korea  Indonesia
Equalizing fiscal capacities  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Weakly  Yes  Yes  Weakly
Adjusting for Expenditure needs  No  No  Yes  Weakly  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Sources of equalization  fund  Central  Central  Central  VAT sharing  Central  fixed portions  fixed  fixed  Central
government  government  govemment  inter-regional  government  of income tax  percentages of  percentage  of  government
revenue  revenue  revenues  transfers (from  revenue  and value  5 central taxes  total national  revenue
rich to poor  added tax  tax revenues
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  states)
Data requirement  Ad hoc  Data on  Data on  Data on local  Data on  Data on  Data on local  Data on local  Main scheme is
subnational  properties  tax bases and  local tax  population,  tax bases and  tax bases and  an equal per
tax bases  (provided by  expenditure  bases and  income, land  detailed  detailed  capita transfer.
localities)  factors  detailed  area, and tax  expenditure  expenditure  only need data






Grant administration  Functional  Dept. of  Dept. of  Ministry of  Grants  Finance  Ministry of  Ministry of  Ministry of
Depts. ofthe  Finance  Eniron.  Finance  Commnission  Commission  Autonomy  Home Affairs  Finance.
Federal  and Planning  Ministry of
Govt  Commission  Home Affairs
49PART IV. A FORMULA-BASED  EQUALIZATION TRANSFER SYSTEM FOR CHINA:
MODEL AND SIMULATIONS
The  current  Chinese central-provincial fiscal  transfer  system  mainly  consists of  three
mechanisms. 22 The first mechanism  is based on the old contract system prevailing  during 1988-1993.
That is, after 1994,  the localities  (provinces  and cities with independent  planning  status) continue  to remit
revenues  to or receive  transfers from the center according  to their fiscal contracts  in effect in 1993. The
second  type of transfer is "returned  revenue"  from the center according  to a calculation  that ensures  each
locality  retains  no less  than what it did in 1993. These  two types of transfers are general  purpose  transfers,
or unconditional  transfers.  The third type of transfer includes  various specific purpose grants, such as
those for price subsidies,  educational  projects,  environmental  projects,  disaster  relief, and the development
of poor regions.
The general  purpose transfers from the center to the localities  account for the major part of the
total transfers. In 1994,  the central  government's  net transfer  to the local governments  amounted  to about
181 billion Yuan, of which two-thirds were general purpose grants.  However,  these general purpose
transfers suffer from at least two major flaws.  First, they were not designed  to address  the increasingly
significant  regional  disparity  issue; rather, they were largely designed  to recognize  the vested interests  of
the localities.23 Second,  the criteria by which  these transfers are allocated  are rather ad hoc, that is, the
transfer system  lacks scientific  measurements  of fiscal capacities  and fiscal needs. This can easily lead to
an unjustified  distribution  and encourage  the localities'  bargaining  activities.
T'his  part presents  an illustrative  equalization  transfer model  and the simulation  result using 1994
data on China. It provides  the estirnates  of fiscal capacities  and fiscal  needs of 30 Chinese  provinces  using
the methods  discussed  in the paper.  Based on a formula  that aims to ensure that provinces  with similar
levels of tax effort be able to provide  similar levels of public services,  the calculation  results in a set of
hypothetical  transfers from the center to the provinces  in 1994. These results are then compared  with the
actual  transfers  made  to the provinces  in 1994.
The method  used to calculate  the provincial  fiscal capacities  and fiscal needs may be considered
overly simplified  and the quality of data can certainly  be improved. Nevertheless,  the estimation  carried
out here is simply  intended  to provide  an illustrative  example  of how an equalization  transfer formula  with
a minimum  data requirement  can be constructed. The following  sections  discuss  the methodology  and the
results.
4.1. Estimating Fiscal Capacities
22 In  1996,  a formula-based  equalization  transfer  system  was introduced  on an experimental  basis.  This
system  applies  a formula  that uses  objective  variables  to calculate  local  fiscal  capacities  and needs. However,  the
size  of this  transfer  program  was  only  $2 billion  Yuan,  or 0.5  percent  of the  central  governnent  revenue.
2  According  to some  studies,  China's  regional  disparity  is among  the  highest  in the  world.
50Two methods  were  tried to determine  the fiscal  capacities  of the provinces,  that is, the revexnue  each
province vould be able to collect  with an average level of tax effort. The most important  element  in this
calculation  is the estimation  of the provinces'  tax bases. The first method  uses provinces'  GDP levels  as
proxies o1f  the tax bases.  To see how well GDP can forecast revenue,  an OLS regression of a linear
equation  with no intercept  is conducted. The result  is:
Regression  I: REVi  = 0.0  186GDPi  (1)
R-square = 0.75,  No. of observations  = 30, Degrees  of freedom  =28
where REV,  represents  revenue  collected  province  i in 1994, and GDPi is the value of province  i's gross
domestic  product  in 1994. The result suggests  that the differences  in GDP can explain 75 percent of the
variations  in revenue  across  provinces.24
Instead  of using an output measure such as GDP as a proxy of the tax base, the second  method
attempts  to estimate  the local  tax base using  two variables:  the total retail sales and the before-tax  profits  of
industrial  enterprises. This is based on the assumption  that business  tax and personal  income  tax--the two
major local taxes--are positively  correlated  with total retail sales, and another  major local tax--corporate
25 income  tax--is positively  correlated  with profits of industrial  enterprises.  Using  these two variables as
explanatory  variables,  the second  regression  yields  a better fit:
Regression  II: REVi  = 0.0896 SALES 3 + 0.1679  PROFi  (2)
(4.90)  (2.84)
R-square  = 0.88,  No. of observations  = 30, Degrees  of freedom  =28
where SALESi  is province i's total retail sales in 1994, and PROFi is the profits of the province's  state
owned industrial enterprises  in 1994.  Roughly speaking,  the regression  results suggest that if all local
taxes are levied  on these  two bases,  the national  average  effective  tax rate on total sales is 8.96 percent,  and
the national  average  effective  tax rate on corporate  profits is 16.8  percent. The R-square  of 0.88 suggests
that 88 percent of the variations in revenue collection can be  explained  by variations in these two
variables. 26
24 When  the structure  of the economy  (percentage  of agriculture  in GDP) is added  to the regression  as the
second  explanatory  variable,  R-square  improves  only slightly  to 0.77, and its coefficient  is not statistically
significantd.
25 25 percent  of VAT  assigned  to provinces  is not considered  as local  tax in this  exercise,  as it is included  in the
transfer  cadculated  from  the  acual local  revenue  and expenditure  figures.
26 To find out whether  individual  disposable  income  (the  tax base for personal  income  tax) is important  in
determinirg  revenue,  this variable  is added  to the regression  but yields  no improvement  in the R-square. When
tax effort  i(revenue/GDP  ratio)  is added  to the  above  regression,  the  R-square  further  increases  to 0.94. However,
51Because  the second  method  represents  a better forecast  of actual revenues,  it is used to estimate  the
provinces'  fiscal capacities. That is, the following  equation  is employed  to estimate  the fiscal capacities  of
the provinces:
Ci = 0.0896 SALESi + 0.,1679  PROFi  (3)
where  C, is the fiscal  capacity  of province  i.  The  estimated  fiscal  capacities  are reported  in Table A-2.
4.2. Estimating Fiscal Needs
The fiscal need of each province  is broken down into seven categories:  education,  health, social
welfare,  police and law enforcement,  infiastructure,  government  administration,  and other services. For
each category,  I construct  a formula  to determine  the expenditure  needs  of the province. The  variables  used
in these formulas  are the most important  determinants  of the expenditure  and are those for which data are
readily  available.
The variables  used to determine  the needs under  the seven  categories  are:
Education: population,  average  number  of years of education
Health: population,  average  life expectancy
Social welfare:  population,  percentage  of population over age 65, urban unemployment
rate
Police  and  law enforcement:  population,  percentage  of urban population
Infrastructure: length  of roads,  area
Government  administration:  population
Other  services:  population
Determining  the fiscal  need  of each  province  involves  three steps:
Step 1: determining  the share of each spending category in total spending. The share of each
expenditure  category  in total expenditure  is calculated  using  the actual  spending  figures  in 1994:
Table 1. Local  Expenditures  by Category,  1994  (100 Mil Y)




Amount  Share a
Educaticn,  Culture,  and Related  Expenses  83858  0.276
Health, Family  Planning,  and Sports  27467  0.090
Social  Welfare  9416  0.031
Government  Administration  66539  0.219
Police  and Law Enforcement  22000  0.072
Infrastructure  Maintenance  23416  0.077
Other services  (including  subsidies)  71211  0.234
Subtotal  303907  1
Note: capital expenditures,  except for urban maintenance,  are excluded. Infrastructure  maintenance  is
named "urban  maintenance"  in China  Almanac  of Finance  1995.
Data Souirce:  China  Almanac  of Finance 1995.
Trhe  total fiscal need of 30 provinces  in category  k (k = education,  health, etc.) is the weight  (ak)
multiplied  by the total fiscal need  of all categories. Denoting  total local need  of all categories  by TN, the
total fiscal  need  in category  k is
rNk  = ak*TN
Step 2: determining  the fiscal need  of each province  in category  k.  For education  (k=E),  the fiscal
need  of province  i is calculated  using  the following  formula:
NiE = TNE(PiEi/XjPjEj)  = aE*TN(PiEi/£jPjEj)  (4)
where  NiE is province  i's fiscal  need  for education,  aE=0. 276 is the weight  assigned  to education,  TNE  is the
30 provinces'  total fiscal  need  for education,  Pi is the population  of province  i, Ei is the ratio of the national
average  niumber  of years of education  to that in province  i, and P,E/jPjFj is the share of province  i's fiscal
need in tie 30 provinces'  total need  for education.
For health (k=H),  the fiscal  need  of province  i is calculated  using  the following  formula:
NiH  = TNH(PiL,/EjPjLj)  = alH*TN(PiLi/EjPjLj)  (5)
where NiH  is province  i's fiscal need for health, cti=O.090  is the weight  assigned  to health, TNH  is the 30
provinces'  total fiscal need for health, L, is the ratio of the national average life expectancy  to that in
province  i, P,Li£jPjl; is the share of province  i's fiscal  need  in the 30 provinces'  total need  for health.
53For social  welfare  (k=S),  the fiscal  need  of province  i is calculated  using the following  formula:
Nis  = TNs(0.5*PiOLDi/jPjOLDj  + 0.5*PiUMP./zjPjUMPj)
= as*TN(O.5*PiOLDi/ZjPjOLDj  + 0.5*PiUMP,/zjPjUMPj)  (6)
where Nis  is province  i's fiscal need for social  welfare,  as=0.03  1 is the weight  assigned  to social welfare,
TNs is the 30 provinces'  total fiscal need  for social  welfare, OLDi  is the ratio of the percentage  of elderly
population  (over  age 65) in province  i to the national  average,  UMPi  is the ratio of the urban unemployment
rate in province  i to the national  average, and 0.5*PiOLDi/EjPjOLDj  + 0.5*PiUMPi/EjPjUMPj  is the share
of province  i's fiscal  need  in the 30 provinces'  total need  for social  welfare.
For government  administration  (k=G),  the fiscal  need  of province  i is calculated  using  the following
formula:
N;G=  TNG(Pi/7jPj) = aH*TN(Pi/EjPj)  (7)
where NiG  is province  i's fiscal need for government  administration,  acL0.219 is the weight assigned  to
government  administration,  TNo is the 30 provinces'  total fiscal need for government  administration,  and
P,/I:jPj  is the share  of province  i's fiscal  need  in the 30 provinces'  total need  for government  administration.
For police and law enforcement  (k=P), the fiscal need of province i  is calculated  using the
following  formula:
Nip  = TNp(PiL 1/ZjPjLj)  = ap*TN(PiUBi/YjPjUBj)  (8)
where Nip  is province  i's fiscal need for police and law enforcement,  ap=0.072 is the weight assigned  to
police  and law enforcement,  TNp  is the 30 provinces'  total fiscal need  for police and law enforcement,  UBi
is the ratio of percentage  of urban population  in this province  to the national  average,  and PjUB2/;jPjUBj  is
the share of province  i's fiscal  need  in the 30 provinces'  total need  for police  and law enforcement.
For infratructure (k=I),  the fiscal  need  of province  i is calculated  using the following  formula:
Nil  = TN 1(0.5*LR 1/ZLRj + 0.5*Ai/ljAj)  = aI*TN(0.5*LR,/ELRj  + 0.5*A,/£jAj)  (9)
where Nil is province  i's fiscal need for infrastructure,  a0 =0.077 is the weight  assigned  to infrastructure,
and TN, is the 30 provinces'  total fiscal  need for infrastructure. LR, is the total length  of roads in province
i, and Ai is the area of province  i.  The former  reflects  the need for maintenance,  and the latter reflects  the
cost due to sparsity  of population. 0.5*LRi/ZLRj  + 0.5*Ai/:jA;  is the share of province  i's fiscal need in
the 30 provinces'  total need  for infrastructure.
For other services  (k=O),  the fiscal  need  of province  i is calculated  using  the following  formula:
N 1o = TNo(P,/YjPj)  = x*TN(P/YjPj)  (10)
54where  Nic)  is province  i's fiscal need  for other services,  a070.234 is the weight  assigned  to other services,
TNo is the 30 provinces'  total fiscal need for other services,  and Pi/EjPj  is the share of province  i's fiscal
need  in the 30 provinces'  total need  for other services.
Step 3. summing  up province  i's needs in the seven categories  to get the total fiscal need of the
province:
Nj = aE(PiE,/;jPjEJ)  + au(PiL/ZjPjL 1) + as(O.5*PiOLDi/£jPjOLDj  +
0 5*PiUMPi/TjPjUMPK)  + ao(Pi/YjPj) + ap(PiUBi/ZPjUB;)  +
a 1 (O.5*LRi/TLRj  + 0.5*A./1jA)  + uo(P,/i;Pj)  (11)
where  Ni is the  total fiscal  need  of province  i.
Equation  (11) can be rewritten  as follows  by combining  some  terms:
N, =  ccE(PiEi/EjPjE)  + aH(PiL,/1jPLj) + as(0.5*PiOLD/FjPjOLDj +
0.5*PiUMPi/zJPJUMPi)  + ap(PiUBi/1PjUB) +
ai(0.5*LRi/ELRj  + 0.5*A,/ZjAj)  + (ao+aO)(PI£1Pj)
= 0.276(PiE 1 /YjPjEj)  + 0.090(P,L-J/PALj)  +
0.31(0.5*PiOLD  /13PjOLD;  + 0.5*PjUMP./.P.jUMPp)  +
0.072(P 1UB,/ZPjUBj)  + 0.077(0.5*LRi/1LRj  + 0.5*Ai/1jAj)  +
0.453(Pi/1jPi)  (12)
Step 4. adjusting  for cost differentials  across  provinces. The above  calculation  has not considered
the cost differentials  across provinces  in providing  the same  level of public services. With limited  data, I
constructed  a wage-and-cost  index,  using  prices of food and construction  materials  and wage levels. Each
of the first two commodities  is given  a weight  of 0.25, and the wage level  is given  a weight  of 0.5. There is
obviously much room for improvement,  but the present data are sufficient to serve as an illustrative
example.
The wage-and-cost  index  is fixed  at 1 for the national  average. If a province's  index  is higher  than
1, it means  the unit cost of providing  public services  there is higher  than the national average,  and vice
versa. The index  figures  are shown  in Table A-l(b).
The cost adjusted  fiscal need  of province  i is:
AN; = WCIiN;  (13)
where  AN, is the cost adjusted  fiscal  need of province  i, WCIi  is the wage-and-cost  index  of province  i, and
Ni is the fiscal need  calculated  using equation  (12).
554.3. Transfers  to the Provinces
Using  two different  definitions  of "needs,"  the transfers to the provinces  are different. If the fiscal
need  figures (unadjusted  for cost differentials)  are used,  the transfer  from the center  to province  i is:
Ti = Ni - Ci
where  Ni is given  by equation  (12). If the cost adjusted  fiscal need  figures are used, the transfer  from the
center  to province  i is:
Ti =ANi -Ci
where  AN, is given  by equation  (13). Transfers  calculated  using these  formula  are presented  in Table A-3.
For comparison,  the actual  transfers in 1994  are also presented  in Table A-3.
The above calculations  assume  that 100 percent of the central  government  transfers made in 1994
be allocated  according  to the proposed equalization  formula.  In other words, the proposed system is a
"fill" equalization  system. However,  the distribution  of transfers under this system is distinctly  different
from the actual allocation  in 1994:  the standard  deviation  (the  average  difference  between  the proposed  per
capita transfer and the actual per capita transfer) is 263 Yuan, or 198 percent of the average per capita
transfer in  1994 (See Table A-4).  Obviously, such a  drastic reallocation  of resources is politically
infeasible.  I thus tried  two alternative  "partial"  equalization  schemes:
(1) 50 percent equalization.  50 percent equalization  means that 50 percent of the actual
central  governnent  transfers  (net)  made  to the localities  in 1994  are allocated  in proportion
to  the original allocation and the other 50  percent are allocated by the  proposed
equalization  formula  using cost adjusted  figures. From  Table A-4, one can see that under
this system  the standard  deviation  from  the actual allocation  now  becomes  132  Yuan or 98
percent  of the average  per capital  transfer in 1994.
(2) 20 percent equalization. 20 percent equalization  means  that 80 percent of the actual
central  government  transfers  (net)  made  to the localities  in 1994  are allocated  in proportion
to  the original allocation and the other 20  percent are allocated by  the proposed
equalization  formula  using cost adjusted  figures. From Table A4, one can see that under
this system  the standard  deviation  from the actual allocation  now becomes  53 Yuan or 39
percent  of the average  per capital  transfer  in 1994.
4.4. Does the Transfer  System  Equalize?
The transfer system designed  above aims to  equalize  the provinces'  abilities to provide public
services  at similar  levels  of tax effort. While  equalizing  per capita  income  is not the direct objective,  due to
56a high correlation  between income  and fiscal capacity, a transfer system like the one suggested  above
should  also have  strong  redistributive  effects  on per capita  income.
T  he following  regression  is conducted  to test the hypothesis  that a transfer system equalizes  per
capita  income  across provinces:
PFCTi  = ao  + a, PCGDPi
where  PC'Ti  is the per capita transfer  to province  i, and PCGDPi  is the per capita GDP of province  i.  If a,
is negative  and statistically  significant,  it means  that the system  has a significant  equalization  effect.
When per capita  transfers are calculated  using need figures  unadjusted  for cost differentials,  a, is
significantly  negative. At the same  time, the R-square  is 0.55, implying  that 55 percent  of the variations  of
the transfers across provinces  serves  the purpose  of "equalization."  From Figure 1, one can see a strong
negative  correlation  between  the two indices,  indicating  a significant  redistributive  effect of the proposed
transfer  slystem.  The regression  results  are as follows:
Regression  lll: PCTi  = 544.26 -91.26 PCGDP,
(2.55)  (-14.51)
R.-square  = 0.59, No. of observations  = 30, Degrees  of freedom  =28.
When per capita transfers are calculated  using needs figures adjusted  for cost differentials,  a, is
also significantly  negative. The R-square  is 0.42. The two variables  are plotted  in Figure  2, which shows
a slightly  weaker  correlation  between  the two indices  than that in Figure 1. The regression  results are as
follows:
Regression  IV: PCTi  = 518.77  - 83.93  PCGDP
(1.93) (-4.54)
R-square  = 0.42,  No. of observations  = 30, Degrees  of freedom  =28.
For comparison  purposes,  I used the actual transfer figures in 1994  to run the same regression.
The resulting  a, is statistically  insignificant  and the R-square is only 0.0002, showing  not even a slight
correlation  between  per capita transfers  and per capita  GDP levels. This suggests  that the current  transfer
system  has not effectively  achieved  any redistributive  goal. The regression  results are as follows:
Regression  V: PCTi  = 206.46  - 0.97 PCGDPi
(1.10) (-0.075)
R-square  = 0.0002,  No. of observations  = 30, Degrees  of freedom  =28.
The same regression is also conducted  using the per capita transfer figures generated by the
"partial  equalization"  transfer schemes  proposed  in the previous section. Table 2 compares  the regression
results  of four systems:  actual  transfers  in 1994,  20% equalization,  50% equalization,  and full equalization.
The results show that the full equalization  and 50% equalization  schemes  have statistically  significant
equalization  effect (the slope coefficients  are significantly  negative). The 20% equalization  schemes  do
57have some equalization  effect (the slope coefficient  is negative),  but it is not statistically  significant. The
actual  transfer  scheme  has the least equalization  effect (the  slope  coefficient  is almost  zero).
Table 2. Regression  Results  under Four  Transfer  Schemes:  PCTi  = ao + a, PCGDPi
1994  Actual  20%  50%  100%
Transfer  Equalization  Equalization  Equalization
ao  206.46  268.92  362.62  518.77
(1.10)  (1.36)  (1.66)*  (1.93)*
a,  -0.97  -17.4  41.95  -83.93
(0.075)  (-1.30)  (-2.81)*  (-4.54)*
R2  0.00  0.06  0.22  0.42
DF  28  28  28  28
Note:  the calculations  use cost adjusted  figures  on fiscal  needs. Numbers  in parentheses  are t ratios. A "*"
indicates  that the t ratio is statistically  significant.
4.5. Conclusions
Statistical evidence suggests that  China's current fiscal transfer system performs almost no
redistributive  function. The illustrative  example  of a formula-based  equalization  transfer model  presented
in this appendix shows that an  important improvement  in redistribution  can be made by introducing
appropriate  measures  of fiscal capacities  and needs with appropriate  variables.  One should  notice that
shifting  from the current  transfer system  to a "full  equalization"  system  may  not be feasible  in the short- or
medium  run. A pragmatic  approach  is to increase  the magnitude  of the new transfer  scheme  gradually  over
time in order to minimize  political  difficulties.  The  purpose  of this illustrative  example  is not to provide  the
exact model  that China  is to use; the intent  is to offer an alternative  methodology  to the ones  that are being
considered.
58Table  A-l(a).  China:  Basic  Indicators  by Province
Popu.  GDP  Area  Aged  Urban
per  cap  popu.  unemplmt.
1994  1994  (%)  rate
(Mil.)  (Th. Y)  (Th. Mu)  1987  1994
All  China  1198.50  3.76  9590.09  6.23  2.8
Beijing  11.25  9.64  16.80  7.66  0.4
Tianjini  9.35  7.76  11.31  7.79  1.2
Hebei  63.88  3.36  187.95  6.34  2.8
Shanxi  30.45  2.80  156.30  5.98  1.2
Inner  Mongolia  22.60  3.02  1192.04  4.26  3.7
Liaoning  40.67  6.35  146.15  6.54  2.5
Jilin  25.74  3.76  186.81  5.56  1.8
Heilongjiang  36.72  4.41  451.47  4.17  2.5
Shanghai  13.56  14.54  6.30  11.52  2.8
Jiangsu  70.21  5.78  102.52  8.23  2.1
Zhejiang  42.94  6.21  101.77  8.20  3.1
Anhui  59.55  2.50  139.06  6.35  3.1
Fujian  31.83  5.29  121.12  6.17  2.4
Jiangxi.  40.15  2.57  166.86  5.39  2
ShandorLg  86.71  4.47  156.57  6.72  3.1
Henan  90.27  2.44  167.01  6.33  2.3
Hubei  57.19  3.29  186.10  6.14  3
Hunan  63.55  2.67  212.10  6.43  3.8
Guangdcing  66.89  6.34  177.99  7.28  2.4
Guangxi  44.93  2.76  237.34  6.20  3.6
Hainan  7.11  4.66  33.98  6.36  3.6
Sichuan,  112.14  2.48  570.31  6.79  3.8
Guizhou  34.58  1.51  176.04  4.95  5.5
Yunnan  39.39  2.47  393.33  5.70  2.7
Tibet  2.36  1.94  1220.01  6.67  5
Shaanxi  34.81  2.43  205.52  5.26  3.5
Gansu  23.78  1.90  456.55  4.62  5.3
Qinghai  4.74  2.92  742.82  3.93  6
Ningxia  5.04  2.66  51.73  3.69  5.3
Xinjiang  16.32  4.13  1683.98  4.62  3.2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  State  Statistical  Bureau  (1995).  Cost  data  are  from  Wu  Renhong,  1995,
"China's  Inflation  and  Regional  Disparity,"  and  World  Bank,  1994,  China.
Tnternal  Market  and  Rpgiulations.  Social  indicators  are  from  Yasuko  Hayase  and
Seiko  ]Kawamata, 1991,  Pnpiilat-ion  Policiy  anci  Vital  StAtisting  in  China,
Institute  of Developing  Economies,  Tokyo,  Japan.  Author's  own  calculation.
59Table  A-1(b).  China:  Basic  Indicators  by Province
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------_
Urban  Length  Average  Average  Wage&
Popu  of  roads  years  of  life  cost
(%)  (kms)  educ.  expctncy  index
1994  1994  1987  1987  1992
------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------_
All  China  23.6  1117821  5.68  70.59  1
Beijing  66.6  11532  8.12  74.93  1.19
Tianjin  57.7  4156  7.42  73.64  1.02
Hebei  16.5  50496  5.90  73.26  0.98
Shanxi  25.8  32693  6.29  69.77  0.81
Inner  Mongolia  37.0  44202  6.19  69.24  0.82
Liaoning  45.2  42763  7.00  73.32  0.93
Jilin  43.9  29581  6.69  70.11  0.87
Heilongjiang  49.7  48356  6.55  70.33  0.82
Shanghai  70.5  3721  7.92  75.97  1.29
Jiangsu  23.9  25891  5.91  73.63  1.04
Zhejiang  16.5  33170  5.82  71.82  1.21
Anhui  17.2  30876  4.71  71.21  0.87
Fujian  18.3  44608  5.12  70.90  1.19
Jiangxi  20.9  34556  5.15  68.10  0.86
Shandong  17.4  50225  5.52  72.88  0.90
Henan  14.8  47704  5.43  71.68  0.83
Hubei  29.0  48349  5.92  68.91  0.94
Hunan  16.5  58803  6.00  68.82  1.01
Guangdong  16.1  75716  5.96  73.83  1.57
Guangxi  14.1  39550  5.54  70.81  1.07
Hainan  34.1  13015  5.84  69.76  1.22
Sichuan  16.3  100002  5.40  68.70  0.90
Guizhou  15.4  32398  4.37  70.12  0.95
Yunnan  15.9  65578  4.13  64.25  0.94
Tibet  14.1  21842  1.91  63.50  1.17
Shaanxi  21.3  39058  6.29  69.74  0.91
Gansu  18.8  34984  4.40  70.24  0.97
Qinghai  32.6  17061  3.79  66.40  0.90
Ningxia  28.8  8324  5.15  69.74  0.93
Xinjiang  47.7  28611  6.14  69.25  1.00
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------_
Source:  State  Statistical  Bureau  (1995).  Cost  data  are  from  Wu  Renhong,  1995,
"China's  Inflation  and  Regional  Disparity,"  and  World  Bank,  1994,  China-
Tnternal  Market  and  Rgilat-ion  . Social  indicators  are  from  Yasuko  Hayase  and
Seiko  Kawamata,  1991,  Popiilat-ion  Ponliy  ani  Vital  qt-atiJt-iJr.  in  China,
Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, Japan.  Author's own calculation.
60Table  A-2:  Fiscal  Revenues,  Expenditures,  and  Estimated  Fiscal  Capacities
Actual  Tax  Actual  Actual  Estimated
revenue  effort  expndt.  transfer  fiscal
(Mil. Y)  (Rev/GDP)  (Mil. Y)  (Mil. Y)  capacity
1994  1994  1994  1994  1994
All  China  231159  5.1  392962  161803  228596
Beijing  4585  4.2  9853  5268  9055
Tianjin  5015  6.9  7232  2217  4563
Hebei  9522  4.4  16084  6562  9396
Shanxi  5382  6.3  8923  3541  4562
Inner  Mongolia  3630  5.3  9282  5652  3188
Liaoning  15367  5.9  22358  6991  12657
Jilin  5127  5.3  10459  5332  5213
Heilongjiang  8466  5.2  14240  5774  9368
Shanghai  16962  8.6  19084  2122  14323
Jiangsu  13662  3.4  20017  6355  17909
Zhejiang  9463  3.5  15303  5840  13422
Anhui  5468  3.7  9327  3859  6263
Fujian  9194  5.5  13773  4579  6868
Jiangxi  4929  4.8  9203  4274  4175
Shandong  13466  3.5  21877  8411  16734
Henan  9335  4.2  16962  7627  9989
Hubei  7746  4.1  13720  5974  9679
Hunan  8589  5.1  15149  6560  8103
Guangdong  29870  7.0  41683  11813  24621
Guangxi  6226  5.0  12493  6267  5423
Hainan  2753  8.3  4001  1248  1008
Sichuan  13599  4.9  23739  10140  12181
Guizhou  3124  6.0  7423  4299  2325
Yunnan  7670  7.9  20373  12703  7631
Tibet  554  12.1  3030  2476  196
Shaanxi  4259  5.0  8552  4293  3670
Gansu  2908  6.4  7238  4330  2536
Qinghai  701  5.1  2536  1835  583
Ningxia  717  5.4  1938  1221  603
Xinjiang  2870  4.3  7110  4240  2352
----- _,------------------------------------------------------------__-------
Source:  Tables  A-1  and A-2,  and  author's  own  calculations.
61TabLe  A-3:  Fiscal  Needs  and Fiscal  Transfers
Unadjusted  for cost  differentials  Adjusted  for  cost  differentials
Fiscal  Formula  Per  capita  Fiscal  Formula  Per  capita  Actual
need  transfer formula  need  transfer formula  per cap
transfer  transfer  transfer
(Mil.  Y) (Mil.  Y)  (Y)  (Mil.  Y) (Mil.  Y)  (Y)  (Y)
ALL  China  392962  161803  135.0  387677  161803  135.0  135.0
Beijing  3735  -5238  -465.6  4447  -4687  -416.6  468.3
Tianjin  3014  -1525  -163.1  3086  -1502  -160.6  237.1
Hebei  19585  10030  157.0  19315  10089  157.9  102.7
Shanxi  9640  4998  164.2  7833  3327  109.3  116.3
Inner  Mongolia  9513  6226  275.5  7809  4700  208.0  250.1
Liaoning  13300  633  15.6  12381  -281  -6.9  171.9
Jilin  8634  3368  130.8  7528  2354  91.5  207.1
Heilongjiang  12982  3557  96.9  10688  1343  36.6  157.2
Shanghai  4513  -9657  -712.2  5825  -8644  -637.5  156.5
Jiangsu  21493  3529  50.3  22367  4535  64.6  90.5
Zhejiang  13285  -135  -3.1  16199  2825  65.8  136.0
Anhui  19400  12933  217.2  16936  10857  182.3  64.8
Fujian  10550  3625  113.9  12613  5843  183.6  143.9
Jiangxi  13114  8799  219.2  11341  7288  181.5  106.5
Shandong  26869  9977  115.1  24199  7593  87.6  97.0
Henan  27687  17421  193.0  23007  13240  146.7  84.5
Hubei  18444  8628  150.9  17340  7792  136.2  104.5
Hunan  19790  11505  181.0  20149  12253  192.8  103.2
Guangdong  20700  -3860  -57.7  32586  8101  121.1  176.6
Guangxi  14243  8683  193.2  15363  10110  225.0  139.5
Hainan  2459  1427  200.8  3021  2047  287.9  175.5
Sichuan  36252  23695  211.3  32657  20826  185.7  90.4
Guizhou  11963  9487  274.3  11436  9267  268.0  124.3
Yunnan  14559  6820  173.1  13794  6269  159.1  322.5
Tibet  3374  3129  1325.7  3961  3830  1622.8  1049.2
Shaanxi  11045  7260  208.6  10129  6569  188.7  123.3
Gansu  8987  6350  267.1  8737  6307  265.2  182.1
Qinghai  3139  2516  530.8  2850  2306  486.5  387.1
Ningxia  1810  1188  235.7  1683  1099  218.0  242.3
Xinjiang  8321  5876  360.1  8396  6148  376.7  259.8
Source:  Tables  A-1 and  A-2, and  author's  own calculations.
.62Table  A-4: Fiscal  Transfers  under  Alternative  EquaLization  Schemes  (Yuan)
100%  EquaLization 50%  Equalization  20%  Equalization
-----------------  ----------------- ----------------- ActuaL
Per cap  Differ.  Per  cap  Differ. Per  cap  Differ.  per  cap
transfer  from  transfer  from  transfer  from  transfer
act.  amt.  act.  amt.  act.  amt.  1994
All  China  135.0  0.0  135.0  0.0  135.0  0.0  135.0
Beijing  -416.6  -884.9  25.8  -442.4  291.3  -177.0  468.3
Tianjin  -160.6  -397.7  38.2  -198.9  157.6  -79.5  237.1
Hebei  157.9  55.2  130.3  27.6  113.8  11.0  102.7
Shanxi  109.3  -7.0  112.8  -3.5  114.9  -1.4  116.3
Inner  Mongolia  208.0  -42.1  229.0  -21.1  241.7  -8.4  250.1
Liaoning  -6.9  -178.8  82.5  -89.4  136.1  -35.8  171.9
Jilin  91.5  -115.7  149.3  -57.8  184.0  -23.1  207.1
Heilongjiang  36.6  -120.7  96.9  -60.3  133.1  -24.1  157.2
Shanghai  -637.5  -793.9  -240.5  -397.0  -2.3  -158.8  156.5
Jiangsu  64.6  -25.9  77.6  -13.0  85.3  -5.2  90.5
Zhejiang  65.8  -70.2  100.9  -35.1  122.0  -14.0  136.0
Anhui  182.3  117.5  123.6  58.8  88.3  23.5  64.8
Fujian  183.6  39.7  163.7  19.8  151.8  7.9  143.9
Jiangxi  181.5  75.1  144.0  37.5  121.5  15.0  106.5
Shandong  87.6  -9.4  92.3  -4.7  95.1  -1.9  97.0
Henan  146.7  62.2  115.6  31.1  96.9  12.4  84.5
Hubei  136.2  31.8  120.4  15.9  110.8  6.4  104.5
Hunan  192.8  89.6  148.0  44.8  121.1  17.9  103.2
Guangdong  121.1  -55.5  148.9  -27.7  165.5  -11.1  176.6
Guangxi  225.0  85.5  182.3  42.8  156.6  17.1  139.5
Hainan  287.9  112.4  231.7  56.2  198.0  22.5  175.5
Sichuan  185.7  95.3  138.1  47.6  109.5  19.1  90.4
Guizhou  268.0  143.7  196.2  71.8  153.1  28.7  124.3
Yunnan  159.1  -163.4  240.8  -81.7  289.8  -32.7  322.5
Tibet  1622.8  573.7  1336.0  286.8  1163.9  114.7  1049.2
Shaanxi  188.7  65.4  156.0  32.7  136.4  13.1  123.3
Gansu  265.2  83.1  223.6  41.6  198.7  16.6  182.1
Qinghai  486.5  99.4  436.8  49.7  407.0  19.9  387.1
Ningxia  218.0  -24.2  230.1  -12.1  237.4  -4.8  242.3
Xinjiang  376.7  116.9  318.3  58.4  283.2  23.4  259.8
SD  263.5  131.8  52.7
C.O.V.  1.95  0.98  0.39
Note:  100 percent  equaLization  means  that  100 percent  of the actuaL  centraL  government  transfers  (net)  made
to the localities  in 1994  are  allocated  by the  proposed  equalization  formuLa  using  cost  adjusted  fiscal  need
measurmenl:s.
50 percenit  equalization  means  that  50 percent  of the actual  central  government  transfers  (net)  made to the
localities  in 1994  are aLlocated  in proportion  to the original  allocation  and the other 50 percent are
allocated  by the  proposed  equaLization  formuLa  using  cost  adjusted  figures.
20 percenit  equalization  means  that  80 percent  of the actual  centraL  government  transfers  (net)  made to the
localities  in 1994 are allocated  in proportion  to the originaL  allocation  and the other 20 percent are
aLlocated  by the  proposed  equaLization  formuLa  using  cost  adjusted  figures.
SD:  standard  deviation;  C.O.V.:  coefficient  of variations.
63Appendix:  State-Local  Fiscal  Transfer:  the Cases  of the  United  States,  Canada  and  Brazil
I. State-Local  Fiscal  Transfer  in the  State  of  New  York 27
The State of New York consists of three  levels of government: the state government, 61 county
governments,  and municipal  governments  (62 cities  and 1400  towns  and villages). In addition  to counties  and
municipalities,  there  are a large  number  of school  districts  in the State  of New  York. Except  for those in New
York City, school  districts are not governed  by the cities, towns or villages;  rather, they are organized  for the sole
purpose of running primary and secondary  schools. As a result, school  districts often overlap with cities, towns
and villages.
Fiscal transfers from the state governnent to the local governments  (counties,  municipalities,  and school
districts),  local agencies,  and individual  welfare  recipients  account for a large part of state government  budget. In
fiscal year 1995-6,  $22.5 billion,  or about two thirds of the State of New York's general fund (general revenue)
went to various transfer programs.  Among these transfer programs, the school aid program and the revenue-
sharing program are intergovernmental  transfer programs--they  are distributed  to local governments. Others are
welfare assistance directed to eligible  individuals. Below we discuss the two main intergovernmental  transfer
programs in the State of New York.
(1) School aid  program
In fiscal year 1995-6,  the total arnount  of the school aid was $7.7 billion,  or 34 percent of the total state
transfers to localities. This program provides assistance to school districts to finance primary and secondary
eduction.
The school  aid program is the single largest transfer program in the State of New York (this is also the
case in most other states in  the U.S.).  The distribution  of the aid is based on a set of more than 20 formulas  that
measure the fiscal needs and fiscal capacities of localities  in providing primary and secondary  education. The
major components  of the school  aid program include comprehensive  operating  aid (including  extraordinary  needs
aid), tax equalization  aid, tax effort aid, gifted  and talented  aid, hmited  English  proficiency  aid, public excess cost
aid, declassification  support service  aid, education  related support services aid, reorganization  incentive  operating
aid, transportation aid, building aid, organizational  incentive  building  aid, computer software aid, textbook aid,
instructional  computer  hardware and technology  equipment aid, library materials aid, growth aid, the transition
adjustment, administrative  efficiency  incentive aid, special services aid, BOCES aid, employment  preparation
education  aid, and incarcerated  youth aid.
27  The author would like to thank  Ron Kogelmann, Ed Ingoldsby, Mike Murphy, Lisa Timoney, Rosina
Mulligan,  and Dennise  Norton of the Budget Division,  Executive Department,  State of New York for providing
me with helpful information.
64T  he largest component  of the school aid program, the "Comprehensive  Operating Aid," accounted for
about 56 percent of total educational  aids from the state to localities  in fiscal year 1995-6.  The formula for
calculating  this aid is as follows:
A district's comprehensive  operating aid is determined  by first calculating its "formula aid" and then
comparing  it with the minimum  "flat grant" guarantee.
According  to Education  Law, Section  3602, Subdivision  12,  each district  receives  the greater  of:
(i) "Formula  Operating  Aid"
(ii) US$400 X selected  TWPU (Flat Grant Provision)
wvhere  TWPU = Total Aidable  Pupil Units
Formula Operating  Aid = ($3,900 + Ceiling  Adjustment  ) x Operating  Aid Ratio x
Selected  TAPU for payment
Operating  Aid Ratio = The highest  of the following  but not less  than zero nor
more  than 0.90:
1.35 -(combined  Wealth Ratio x 1.50)
1.00 - (combined  Wealth Ratio x 0.64)
0.80 - (combined  Wealth Ratio x 0.39)
0.51 - (combined  Wealth Ratio x 0.22)
Combined  Wealth Ratio = (0.5 x Full Value Wealth Ratio)
+ (0.5 x Income  Wealth Ratio)
Full Value Wealth Ratio =
1993 Full Value/ 1994-5  TWPU
State Average Full Value/TWPU
($261,300)
Income  Wealth Ratio =
District 1993  Adjusted  Gross Income/1994-5  TWPU
State Average Adjusted  Gross Income/TWPU
($82,800)
65Generally  speaking,  the amount  of aid a district  receives  is determined  by three  factors:  (1)  the number  of
students-the  higher  the number  of students  is, the higher  is the amount  of aid;  (2) wealth  (value  real estate
properties)  of the district  relative  to the average  of the state-the higher  the  wealth  level  is in the district,  the less
the  amount  of aid;  and (3) household  income  level  of the district  relative  to the  average  ofthe state--the  higher  the
income  level  is in the district,  the less the amount  of aid.  The second  and third factors  reflect  the program's
objective  of equalizing  fiscal capacities  of districts  across the state.  One should  note that the relationships
between  these  factors  and the  amounts  of aid  are generally  not  linear.
(2) Revenue-sharing  program (unconditional  transfer program)
Currendy  the size  of this program  is relatively  small. In fiscal  year 1995-6,  the  total amount  distributed
by this program  was $700  million. However,  it used  to be one  of the largest  aid programs  in the State  of New
York. When  the  program  was first created  by state legislation  in 1971,  it was stipulated  that 18  percent  of the
state income  tax receipts  would  be distributed  to cities,  towns,  and villages  within  the State  of New  York. For
fiscal  year 1977-8,  the State capped  the aid program  at the 1976-7  level,  due to the state's  difficult  budgetary
situation. In 1979,  funding  was changed  to 8 percent  of total state tax collection.  From 1980  to 1984-5  State
fiscal  year the funding  was capped  at $800 million. Since 1984-5,  this program  became  a "Base  Year Aid"
program  consisting  of four components:  per capita  revenue  sharing  aid;  aid to special  cities,  town, and villages
and "excess"  aid; and needs-based  aid.  The total amount of this program  was specified  by the annual
appropriation  bills,  and the allocation  across  localities  was based  on the previous  year's  figures  with a uniform
increase  or decrease  rate. Despite  many  small  ad hoc adjustments,  the current  distribution  is largely  determined
by the  formulas  adopted  in 1984-5.
The 1984-5  formulas  consider  the  population,  value  of properties,  and income  level  of each  locality  and
were  designed  to equalize  fiscal  capacities  of the local  governments.  Among  the four  components,  the largest  is
the Per Capita  Revenue  Sharing  Aid,  which  distributed  $800,860,900,  or 83 percent  of the  total revenue  sharing
aid  in fiscal  year 1984-5.  The  special  city,  town,  and  village  aid  distributed  $96,390,000;  "excess"  aid  distributed
$30,400,000;  and "Needs  Based"  aid distributed  $38,800,000.  The following  is a brief  description  of the Per
Capita  Revenue  Sharing  Aid.
The  per capital  revenue  sharing  aid  is distributed  according  to the following  two  general  formulas:
A. Approximately  $400,430,450  to counties,  cities,  towns,  town outside  village  areas,  and villages  as
follows:
1.  Towns- a uniform  per capita  townwide  rate  of $3.55  is allocated,
2. Counties
- $0.65  per capita  is allocated  when  the average  of per capita  full  value  and
per capita  personal  income  is $8,000  or more.
66- An additional  $0.05  per capita  is allocated  for each  $100 or part  thereof  by
which  this  average  falls  below  $8,000.
3. Cities,  Towns  Outside  Villages  Areas,  and Villages
-When  the per capita  full  value  is $8,000  or more,  the per capita  amounts  are:
Cities:  $8.60
Villages:  $3.60
Town  Outside  Village  Area  $22.05
An additional  $0.05 per capita  is allocated  for each  $100 or part thereof  by
which  per capita  full  value  falls  below  $8,000
4. City  of New  York  -There  is no special  formula. The City  is paid  per capita  amounts  under
both  the city  formula  and  the county  formula,  as described  above.
Bt.  Approximately  $400,430,450  to Cities  as follows:
Each  city's  share  is based  on  the ratio  of its population  to the  total population  of all cities  in the
State.
Other  Transfers
hn  addition  to transfers  to local governments,  there are a number  of important  transfers  to other  local
agencies  and to individual  welfare  recipients.  These  include:
(1) Medicaid  assistance  program. In fiscal year 1995-6,  the total amount  was $5.3 billion. This
program  was designed  to provide  health  insurance  for the  poor,  and is co-financed  by the federal  government  and
local  governments.  There  are 33 services  mandated  by federal  legislation  that this program  must provide. The
federal  government  matches  50 percent  of the costs  of these  services. Between  the state  and local  governments,
the  matchng  rate  varies
depending  on the type  of services. For hospital  expenses,  the state covers  25 percent  and the localities  cover
another  2'i percent. For long  term  care,  the state  covers  40 percent  and  the localities  cover  10  percent. In fiscal
year 1996-7,  the budget  contribution  of the  federal  government  to Medicaid  is $12.3  billion,  the  state  contribution
is $9.4  billion,  and  the local  contribution  is $3.9  billion.
(2) Income  maintenance  program. In fiscal year 1995-6,  the total amount of this program was
approximaitely  $2 billion.  This  program  provides  income  support  to unemployed  and  disabled  people.
(3) High  education  aid.  This program  provides  subsidies  to state universities  and tuition  grants for
students  enrolled  in local  community  colleges.  In academic  year 1995-6,  the total amount  of this aid was $626
million.  Tuition  grants  are  provided  based  on economic  needs  of the students.  In 1995-6,  the  maximum  amount
each  student  could  get  was  the  higher  of $3900  and 90  percent  of tuition. For  continuing  to receive  tuition  grants,
studerts  mnust  maintain  certain  number  of credit  hours  and  GPA.
67II. Province-Local  Fiscal Transfer  in Ontario,  Canada
Southern  Ontario  has a two-tier local government  system. The upper-tier municipalities  include  regions
(including  Metro Ontario) and counties.  The lower-tier municipalities include cities, towns, and townships
governed by regions and counties.  Northern Ontario has a single-tier  local government system (regions and
counties). The province  is also divided  into 10 school  boards which are responsible  for financing  and operating
prinary and secondary  education. Similar  to those in the United States, school  boards in Ontario are independent
from the regions  and counties.
The province  allocates  unconditional  and conditional  transfers to municipalities  (regions,  counties,  cities,
towns, townships,  and school  districts)  for both operating (current)  and capital expenses. In 1994,  transfers from
the province accounted for about 32 percent of total municipal revenues. In the same year, the municipalities
raised about 38 percent of their revenues from property taxes and 30  percent from fees and user charges
(including 12 percent from user fees, 10 percent from special charges, and 8 percent from sewer and water
fees). 28
The relative  importance  of transfer as a source of a municipality's  revenue  varies significantly  depending
on several factors. 29 The most important factor is the municipalities'  responsibilities. For example, although
counties  and regions are both upper-tier municipalities,  their responsibilities  differ greatly  (regions  fund their own
police forces and counties  get free police protection). In addition  to providing their own police forces, regions
also tend to provide  more comprehensive  social services  and health care than counties.
The second factor is the revenue capacities of the municipalities. Generally,  urban municipalities  raise
more of their own revenues (and therefore receive less transfers) than municipalities  with a lower degree of
urbanization. In 1988 counties  received  37.8 percent of their current revenues  from provincial  transfers. Metro
Toronto (with a high  proportion of urban population),  on the other hand, received  just 23.1 percent of its revenues
in the form of transfers.
The third factor affecting  the distribution  of transfers is whether a municipality  is located in the north.
Different patterns of provincial  support are also evident in comparing  the north with the south.  For example, in
1988,  transfers account for 27.4 percent of total current revenue  for county cities (those in the south), but 42.6
percent in district  cities (those in the north).  Expressed in dollars per household,  transfers to county cities were
about $713 per household,  while  the corresponding  amount to district  cities was about $1,390 percent household.
Conditional  Grants
28 Ernie Eve, Q.C.,"1995 Fiscal and Economic  Statement,"  1995, Ministry  of Finance  of Ontario.
29 Based on "Report of the Advisory  Committee  to the Ontario  Minister  of Municipal  Affairs on the Provincial-
Municipal Financial  Relationship,"  1991.
68In 1988, about 70 percent of provincial transfers to municipalities  were distributed in the form of
conditional  grants.  Since then, as the size of unconditional  grants was reduced,  the share of conditional  grants
increased  to about 90 percent in the early 1990s.  Conditional  grants are given to municipal agencies  to finance
education,  roads, health  care, environmental  protection,  public libraries,  flood control,  and other services.
Currently there are more than  100 programs of conditional  grants.  Most of these provide matching
grants, which share certain percentages of the cost of locally delivered  services.  For example, the province
matches 50 percent of the cost of road maintenance. The amounts of transfer (conditional  and unconditional)  to
municipalities  in 1991-2  are shown  in the following  table.
Table 1. Major Provincial-Municipal  Cost-Sharing  Programs, Ontario, 1991-2  ($ million)
Provincial  Local
Total
Services  share  taxes  Fees
Municipal  affairs
Uncondiltional  grants  947  --  947
Conditional  grants  36  --  --  36
Other  6  --  6
Education  5,201  6,992  --  12,193
Transportation  823  1,811  146  2,780
Community  and
social  services  1,883  526  --  2,409
Environmental  275  1,455  1,588  3,318
Health  265  183  28  466
Natural resources
and conservation  53  52  ---  105
Cultural anid
communications  41  353  13  407
Tourism and recreation  57  1,076  298  1,431
Total  10,922  13,308  2,960  27,190
69Source: Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Fair Taxation in a Changing World: Report of the Ontario Fair Tax
Commission,  1993.
The largest conditional  transfer program is the provincial  subsidies  to school  boards for elementaxy  and
secondary  eduction. 30 The funding mechanism  is embodied in a set of legal documents  known as the General
Legislative  Grants (GLG) regulations. Through a combination  of operating  and capital assistance  programs, the
GLG regulation  attempts  to mitigate inequalities  in financial  resources among school  boards across the province.
These assistance programs can be referred to as "equalization  payments" since they attempt to equalize the
financial  resources among school boards by taking into account the size of the local tax base (i.e., resources
available)  and the resources  required  by a school  board to provide  the base level  of education  service.
The General Legislative  Grants are comprised  of four components. The first and the most important
component,  called "Basic Per Pupil Grants," is an equalization  payment  made by the province  to a school  board.
This provincial  grant equals the difference  between  the amount considered  necessary  by the province  for a school
board to provide  the base level of education  and the amount raised from local property  taxes.
The calculation  of the basic per pupil grant is based on two key variables:
(1) Average  Daily Enrollment  (ADE), which is the measure of the number of pupils enrolled  in
each school  board. The ADE multiplied  by the provincially  established  basic per pupil amount
equals the recognized  ordinary expenditure  of the school board.  In 1995,  the basic per pupil
amounts  were $4,184 for each elementary  pupil and $5,116 for each secondary  pupil.
(2) The value of the equalized assessment of all property in each community served by the
school  board determines  the amount  of money  that can be raised from local property taxes.
The second component of the General Legislative Grants is  called "Board-Specific Grants."  The
provincial  government  recognizes  that the cost (teacher wages, rental cost, etc.) of providing  the base level of
education varies with geographic, demographic, and  social-economic  conditions across the province.  The
"Board-Specific  Grants" are therefore  design  to assist localities  with additional  costs so that they can provide  the
base level of educational  services  without  placing additional  financial  burden on local taxpayers.
The third component,  called "Program-Specific  Grants", is provided  to school  boards to encourage them
to extend education  programs and services  into areas that respond  to local needs,  and to meet provincial  priorities.
These grants are grouped into four subcategories  which include language grants (e.g., French & English as
second languages), initiative grants (e.g., class size reduction in grades I  and 2), special grants (e.g., student
transportation,  education  programs  in care and treatment  facilities),  and other  grants (e.g., isolated  boards).
30  Local Government Finances in the Greater Toronto Area, "Background Report 3: Subsidy and Service
Levels",  1996.
70The fourth  component,  called  "Capital  Funding  Assistance,"  is distributed  on a cost-sharing  basis to
school  boards. Capital  projects  undertaken  by school  boards  that qualify  for this type  of assistance  include  new
schools,  site purchases,  buses, and replacement  and renovation  of schools. The provincial  share of costs is
provided  ito  school  boards  as loans,  and  the  amount  that a school  board  receives  is dependent  on its relative  taxing
ability.  On average,  the provincial  support rate on growth-related  capital projects,  including  new schools,
additions,  and sites,  is 60  percent.
Unconditional  Grants3'
The unconditional  transfer system has five components plus a revenue guarantee.  Although  they are
referred  to as "unconditional  transfers"  by Canadians,  some of them are actually  block  grants with broad
conditions  attached. The three  most important  components  are:  the Police  per Household  Grant,  the Northern
Support  Grant  (NSG),  and the Resource  Equalization  Grant (REG). Below  is a brief  description  of these  three
programs.
(1) Police  per Household  Grant
T-his  is an equal  per household  grant provided  to regions. The amount of transfer a region receives  is the
product of the number of households  in the region and the uniforn  $50 per household rate.  This grant is not
meant to be a direct subsidy to cover regional policing costs and, as a result, the level of assistance is often
criticized  by regions  as providing  inadequate  compensation  for policing  costs (the average expenditure  on policing
is $290 per household).
(2) Northern Support Grant (NSG)
This grant, introduced  in the 1973 Ontario  budget,  had two purposes.  First, it was intended  to recognize
the higher costs of providing services in the north and, therefore, higher living  costs; and second, it was to
compensate  north municipalities  for the termination  of mining payments.  Prior to 1973, the mining profits tax
was collected  by the province and a portion of it was shared with municipalities  in which miners resided.  In
1973,  these  payments  to municipalities  were replaced  by NSG, as well as the General  Support Grant and REG.
The distribution  of this grant is based on the municipalities'  own revenue  collection. Municipalities  in the
south receive  a transfer  equal to 6.15 percent of their levy  and municipalities  in the north receive  29.65 percent of
their levy.
(3) Resource  Equalization  Grant
lTis grant intends  to close the gap in fiscal capacities across municipalities. Municipalities  with higher
capacities to finance  their services with their own sources  are given less subsidies than municipalities  with lower
capacities. The fiscal capacity of a municipality  is measured by the average value of residential  properties per
3] Based on Advisory  Committee  (1991).
71household. The transfer  is then calculated  by comparing  the assessment  of residential  property  value per
household  of the  municipality  against  the simple  average  assessment  of residential  property  value  per household
for  municipalities  across  the  province.
Pattern of Distribution
On  a per household  basis,  the  level  of fimding  is significantly  higher  in  the north  than  in the south. While
this is largely  the result  of the NSG, the result  is also reinforced  by the fact that most northern  municipalities
receive  significant  funding  under the REG and revenue  guarantee. Moreover,  northem  municipalities  tend to
receive  higher  levels  of conditional  grants.
Table  2. Ontario:  1988  Provincial  Transfers  to Municipalities  per Household  ($)
Unconditional  Conditional  Total
South
Metro  Toronto  217  936  1,153
Co.  Cities  258  581  839
Regions  210  709  919
Counties  169  804  973
North
Regions  635  687  1,322
Dis. Cities  590  921  1,511
Districts  400  1,081  1,481
Total  238  784  1,022
Source:  Advisory  Committee  (1991).
III. State-Municipality  Revenue  Sharing in Brazil 32
Brazil has a  federal system with three levels of government:  the federal government,  the state
governments,  and municipalities.  The federal government  assumes  exclusive  responsibility  for the taxes on
income,  payroll,  wealth,  foreign  trade, banking,  finance  and insurance,  rural properties,  hydroelectricity,  and
mineral  products. The federal  government  allows states  to levy supplementary  rates up to 5 percent  on the
federal  bases for personal  and corporate  incomes.  The main  state  taxes  include  the general  value  added  tax on
goods  and services,  tax on inheritance  and gifts,  and  tax on motor  vehicles  registration.  These  three  taxes  consist
32 Based  on Anwar  Shah,  1991,  The  New  Fiscal  Federalism  in Brazil,  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper,  No. 124.
72of 72 percent  of the states'  revenues.  Municipalities  are empowered  to levy  taxes  on services,  urban properties,
retail  sales  of fuels  except  diesel,  property  transfers,  and special  assessments.
Municipalities  raise  only 18 percent  of revenues  from  their  own  sources  and rely  heavily  on federal  and
state transfers.  The most important  source of transfer is from the federal government,  accounting  for
approximately  half of municipal  revenues.  The second important  source of municipal  revenues  is the
constitutionally  mandated  state-municipal  revenue  sharing  arrangements.  State  transfers  constitute  one third of
municipad  revenues. In many states, municipalities  rely almost exclusively  on transfers from higher-level
governments.
Mechanisms  for state-municipal  revenue  sharing  arrangements  have  been specified  in the regulations
issued  by the  federal  parliament.  The  regulations  provide  specifics  of the  formula  as well  as timing  for  the release
of funds. The most recent  regulations  as given  in Projeto  de lei Complementar  no. 177 (1989)  specifies  that
municipal  shares of federal  and state transfers  should be immediately  deposited  in the joint account  of all
municipalities.  Further,  individual  municipal  accounts  should  be credited  no later  than  the second  working  day of
each  weck  for all revenues  received  in the  previous  week.
T-he  formulas  for state-municipal  transfers  are highly  transparent  and have been  instituted  by Federal
regulations.  Distribution  of tax transfers  for  the most  part follows  the  origin  principle.  ICMS  (state  value  added
tax) revenues  are distributed  by a formula  which  mandates  that at least  75 percent  of such  revenues  to municipal
governments  be allocated  based  on  value  added  produced  in the  municipalities.  Since  ICMS  is a value  added  tax,
this clearly  recognizes  the origin  as the guiding  principal  in the distribution  of these  transfers. Following  this
principle,  municipal  transfers  in per capita  terms  shows  a wide  divergence  across  states. Small  weight  is given  in
the formula  to other  factors  which  the individual  states  may  consider  important  in the distribution  of these  monies
in their  jurisdictions.  For example,  the State  of Para uses  population  (7 percent  weight),  area (2 percent),  and
fiscal  effort  (9 percent)  as special  factors. In addition,  the State  of Para  distributes  7 percent  of the fund  in equal
amounts  per municipality.  The State  of Parana  uses  proportion  of population  in rural  areas,  population,  and area
as special  need  factors.
The  specific  formulas  of state-municipal  revenue  sharing  are  as follows:
a. State Value  Added  Tax  (ICMS)
The  distribution  of ICMS  to municipalities  is determined  by the  following  formula:
Mi  = 0.25*ICMS{(VAN/VA,)*p  + (other  factors)*  (1-p)}
where  M = funds  allocated  to municipality  i;
VA -=  value  added  (average  of past two  years)
= value  of outflow  of goods  + value  of services  rendered  within  municipality  value
of inflow  of  goods
P = proportion  of funds  distributed  by values  added  component  (the  following  range  for
p is specified  by law  (L.C.  no. 177):  0.75<=p<=1.
Other  factors  = each  state  is given  complete  discretion  over  specific  other  factors  to be
73included  in the  fornula
b. Motor  Vehicle  Registration  Tax
50 percent  of  the receipts  of this  tax are returned  to municipalities  by State  Treasury  by
origin.  The  funds  are  immediately  disbursed  to municipalities  upon  collection.
c. Federal  Industrial  Product  Tax  (IPI)
This program  is intended  to provide  financial  compensation  to states  for  loss  of ICMS
revenues  on account  of exports. The  distribution  criteria  is the same  as that for ICMS.
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